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Abstract
Many U.S. food policies aim to improve access to food for low-income households by
either increasing household resources or providing more places to spend resources on
healthy foods. In my dissertation I investigate how low-income households respond to
policies designed to improve food access. My first chapter explores how policy incentives
influence consumer choice of food retail store format. In my second chapter, I pose and
test an new explanation for the speed at which U.S. food assistance benefits are spent
throughout the month. Finally, my last chapter measures the impact of a food assistance
work requirement on labor market outcomes. Each chapter provides novel insights into
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Many U.S. food policies aim to improve access to food for low-income households. These
policies generally either increase household resources - for example, the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) - or provide more places to spend existing
resources - for example, the Healthy Food Financing Initiative. Since poor access to food
can lead to poor diets and health problems such as obesity, diabetes, and high blood
pressure, these policies play an important role in the U.S. social safey net. There is
much, however, that remains unknown about how households respond to these policies.
My dissertation therefore seeks to add to current understanding of how households are
influenced by and interact with food access policies.
In my first essay, I measure the influence of two policy options on consumer choice
of food retail store format. The two policy options I investigate are: (1) opening more
grocery stores, and (2) giving households more resources. These are the two most
commonly-suggested policies for encouraging households to shop more at grocery stores
and less at convenience stores, which do not stock many healthy food options. Using
the estimates of policy impacts, I am able to discuss under what conditions one policy
option is preferred over another, and quantify the tradeoffs between policies.
My second essay asks to what extent transaction costs influence how quickly SNAP
participants spend their benefits. SNAP participants on average spend most of their
benefits within the first few days of the month, leaving little to use later in the month.
Previous research has sought to understand why this pattern exists, and no satisfactory
explanation has been found except for observing that SNAP spending behavior is
1
consistent with the behavior we would expect from individuals with inconsistent time
preferences. I ask whether difficulty in traveling to the grocery store can explain (some
of) this phenomenon.
In my third essay, I examine how SNAP participants respond to a SNAP work
requirement. Safety net programs such as SNAP provide clear benefits to participants
and potential participants. However, a common worry is that generous safety net
programs will discourage participants from working. Work requirements have therefore
been implemented for SNAP as well as other programs, and have been suggested for
other programs. Able-bodied adults without dependents (ABAWDs) are required to
work in order to participate in SNAP for more than a few months. This work requirement
can be waived in areas and during times of high unemployment. To quantify the impact
of the work requirement, I take advantage of spatial and temporal variation in waivers
to measure the impact of waiving the work requirement. I measure the impact of work
requirement waivers on the labor force outcomes of ABAWDs.
2
Chapter 2
Consumer Choice of Store
Format: Response to Policy
Incentives
2.1 Introduction
Policies to address obesity in the U.S. often focus on encouraging households to shop for
food at grocery stores instead of alternatives with less-healthy options, such as convenience
stores. Previous research has shown that individuals in low-income neighborhoods are
more likely to suffer from obesity and diet-related disease, and also often live further away
from grocery stores, than those in higher-income neighborhoods (Black and Macinko,
2008). These assocations have driven the concern that low-income households rely on
convenience stores because grocery stores are too far away. Since convenience stores
stock less-healthy food than grocery stores, and purchases from convenience stores are on
average less healthy than purchases from grocery stores,1 this over-reliance on convenience
stores relative to grocery stores is often cited as a driver of diet and health disparities.2
1 For evidence on stocking behavior by store format, see for example Handbury et al. (2016), Glanz
et al. (2007), Cannuscio et al. (2013), and Leone et al. (2011). Stern et al. (2016) and Volpe et al.
(2017) report differences in purchase healthfulness by store format. We note that the evidence for a
causal relationship between shopping at a store format and the healthfulness of purchases is limited.
2For overviews of the reseach on the relationship between diet or obesity and the food retail environ-
ment, see for example Gordon-Larsen (2014), Larson et al. (2009), Walker et al. (2010), and Caspi et al.
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Most policies to encourage shopping at grocery stores in low-income neighborhoods have
sought to increase the supply of grocery stores by providing targeted incentives for stores
to locate in underserved areas.3 Alternatively, scholars have suggested that policies to
increase the demand for grocery store food might encourage grocery store shopping
(Bitler and Haider, 2011; Andrews et al., 2016). The extent to which supply-focused
and demand-focused policies increase shopping at grocery stores relative to other store
formats is an open question.
In this paper, we measure the short-term impact of a supply-side policy - increasing
the supply of grocery stores - and a demand-side policy - increasing household food
resources - on a household’s choice of store format. We use novel Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) administrative data that provide exact household locations
and exact locations of available stores, as well as a record of a household’s SNAP
transactions over time. We leverage quasi-experimental variation in household proximity
to a store format - via store openings and closings - and income - via nationwide SNAP
benefit increases - to measure household response to supply vs demand policy proposals.
Our results provide estimates of the sizes of the household response which allow us to
contrast the impacts of supply and demand policies.
This paper is closest in spirit to two recent working papers that also measure the
effect of grocery store openings on household shopping behavior. Handbury et al. (2017)
and Allcott et al. (2017) estimate the effect of multiple grocery store openings using
Nielsen scanner data and information on store locations over time.4 Handbury et al.
(2017) find that a greater concentration of stores near a household’s census tract centroid
increases the nutritional quality of food purchases for wealthier households but not for
lower-income households, calling into question the impact of supply-side policies on the
diets of low-income households. Allcott et al. (2017) find that most of the expenditures
at supermarkets that open close to a household’s census tract centroid are diverted from
other grocers, and that store entry has no impact on purchase healthfulness. Given the
small impact of access on outcomes, Handbury et al. (2017) and Allcott et al. (2017)
(2012).
3At the federal level, the primary legislation to improve the supply of grocery stores is the Healthy
Food Financing Initiate. Examples of state and local policies are the Pennsylvania Fresh Food Financing
Initiative (2004-2010) and the New York City Food Retail Expansion to Support Health program.
4Handbury et al. (2017) use store location data from the Nielsen TDLinx dataset, and Allcott et al.
(2017) collect opening dates and locations of new supermarkets from a number of specific chains.
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attribute differences in shopping behavior primarily to preferences rather than time or
income constraints that limit access to grocery stores.
We extend Handbury et al.’s (2017) and Allcott et al.’s (2017) analysis by using a
comprehensive dataset on a policy-relevant low-income population as well as looking at
an alternative policy to potentially increase grocery store purchases. The Nielsen data
used by Handbury et al. and Allcott et al. are known to under-represent low-income
households,5 which is the population that we would expect this policy to have the largest
influence on as well as the population for which these policies are designed. It is therefore
unclear whether the small impact found by Handbury et al. and Allcott et al. reflects
the response of low-income populations more generally, or is an artefact of the Nielsen
dataset. Our data allow us to test this by looking specifically at SNAP households, which
are by definition low-income. In addition to providing information on a low-income
population, our datset has other benefits relative to the Nielsen data that make it
particularly well-suited for examing household response to the food retail environment.
With exact household and store locations, our data allow us to measure household
proximity to store formats with unprecedented detail - the Nielsen data that Handbury
et al. (2017) and Allcott et al. (2017) use only allow identification of households at
the census tract level. Measurement error introduced by locating households at the
census tract centroid could be expected to attenuate any potential impacts, and could be
another reason for the small impacts found by Handbury et al. (2017) and Allcott et al.
(2017). Furthermore, our data provides information on each SNAP transaction made by
each household, whereas the Neilsen data have documented underreporting of purchases
and shopping trips (Einav et al., 2010) which could be worse for certain demographics
(Zhen et al., 2009). Finally, we have information on SNAP transactions made at - and
store availability of - non-traditional store formats such as corner stores, gas-marts,
pharmacies, and small ethnic grocers, which are not as well captured in national store
databases. In addition to a dataset that has multiple benefits over the Nielsen data, we
leverage our purchase information over time for SNAP households to compare the effect
5Handbury et al. (2016), a previous version of their 2017 working paper, acknowledge this. They
show in both versions that their results are robust to the exclusion of food assistance-eligible households.
Allcott et al. (2017) show that the impact of grocery store openings is larger for low-income households
in the Nielsen dataset, though not large enough to change their conclusions.
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of opening a grocery store with the impact from increasing SNAP benefits.6
A few other papers in the public health literature have sought to use quasi-experimental
methods to examine the impact of opening grocery stores on household shopping beha-
vior. Cummins et al. (2014) and Elbel et al. (2015) measure the effect of two separate
grocery store openings, and in results echoing Handbury et al. (2017) and Allcott et
al. (2017) find no impact on diets even among households that use the new store. We
build on these studies by using all store openings within a city over a two-year period,
allowing store openings to have an impact beyond an arbitrarily-defined neighborhood,
and allowing the impacts within neighborhoods to vary.
Little is known about the impact of increasing resources on household store format
choice. Conceptually, households trade off convenience, variety, and prices when deciding
where to shop, and the net effect of more resources on the choice of store format is unclear.
Andrews et al. (2013) use a similar identification strategy as ours along with county-level
SNAP redemption data. Their results are ambiguous, which they attribute to using
aggregated data. We are able to directly observe household response to increasing SNAP
benefits rather than inferring it from county-level data.
We find that opening a grocery store near a household increases the share of expendi-
tures at grocery stores, and that the impact varies by distance to the grocery store and
household car ownership. The effect strongly depends on car ownership: households with
cars are responsive to grocery store openings at greater distances, while the impact on
households without cars is concentrated on those closer to the new store. On average, a
grocery store opening within 0.5 miles of a household increases the share of expenditures
at grocery stores by 4 percentage points for households with cars and 8 percentage
points for households without cars. Previous research has highlighted the relationship
between car ownership and employment (Baum, 2009; Gurley and Bruce, 2005), but to
our knowledge we are the first to illustrate the importance of car ownership on the use of
public assistance benefits and food shopping behavior.7 When a new grocery store opens,
all households reduce shopping at small ethnic stores, and households with cars also
6Cleary et al. (2018) use results from a structural model of grocery store entry to simulate the impact
of a demand-side and supply-side policy to improve access to grocery stores, which they then compare.
They are, however, unable to observe actual grocery store openings or resource increases.
7Inagami et al. (2009) let car ownership moderate the association between restaurant concentration
and body mass index, but do not look at household shopping per se.
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reduce shopping at discount stores. Furthermore, in response to a grocery store opening
households without cars shop somewhat less at convenience stores, while households
with cars may actually increase shoppping at convenience stores.
When households receive increased resources, they increase the share of expenditures
at grocery stores and correspondingly decrease the share at convenience stores. This
impact is largest for households without cars. Most of the extra resources are spent at
grocery stores, which is consistent with the fact that households spend most of their
SNAP benefits at grocrey stores overall. When we compare the percent of extra resources
spent at each store format with the average budget shares for each format, we find that
while households without cars spend the extra resources as we would expect, car owners
spend much less at grocery stores and much more at small ethnic grocers than we would
expect.
Given estimates of household responses to both demand- and supply-side policies, we
are able to directly compare these policy directions. Our results suggest that demand-side
policies unambiguously shift relative spending away from convenience stores and towards
grocery stores, but total spending would increase at convenience stores for households
without cars and car owners spend more than expected at ethnic stores. Finally, we are
also able to use our results to quantify the amount of extra resources that a household
would need to receive in order to have the same impact on grocery store shopping as
opening a new store. To have the same impact on the share of expenditures at grocery
stores as opening a grocery store within 0.5 miles of a household, we would have to give
households without cars an extra $381 and households with cars $1,300 per month. To
have the same impact on total grocery store expenditures, however, we would have to
give households without cars $14.3 and car owners $19.5.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. We start by developing a theoretical
model that provides intuition regarding the choices faced by households which also
motivates our empirical analysis. We then describe the unique features of our adminis-
trative SNAP dataset and how we use it to examine the impact of both changing access
and resources on household shopping behavior. This empirical framework as well as
the results of improving access and resources follow. We end with a discussion of the




We now propose a simple theoretical model to illustrate the stylized choice faced by a
household choosing between a grocery store far away that stocks both unhealthy and
healthy foods, and a nearby convenience store that stocks only unhealthy food. We
assume the household solves the problem in two stages: In the second stage the household
decides how much to buy conditional on store choice, and in the first stage the household
decides where to shop. This model extends Hausman and Leibtag (2007) and Anas
(2006) by explicitly examining factors influencing the store choice.
The household receives utility from a healthy food, “kale” (k), unhealthy food, “candy
bars” (b), leisure time tl, and an additive stochastic term, and has a one-period food
budget Y to spend on either kale or candy bars. The household chooses to visit one
of two stores: a convenience store located tc minutes away, or a grocery store located
tg minutes away. Following the usual stylized facts of food deserts, the grocery store
is further away than the convenience store (tg > tc). The convenience store sells only
candy bars at price pcb, while the grocery store sells candy bars at pgb and kale at pgk.
Finally, the household has time allocation T to split between leisure time and grocery
shopping, such that tl = T − tc or tl = T − tg.8 We assume there is only enough time in
this period to shop at one of the stores (tc < tg < T < 2tc), so the model reduces to a
discrete choice between visiting the convenience store or the grocery store.
In the second stage, once the household has chosen a store to visit, the household
maximizes utility9 subject to the store-specific budget constraint. The household chooses
in the first stage the store that will give it the greatest (indirect) utility. With this setup,
we show in Appendix A.1 the following implications regarding the effects of demand-
and supply-focused policies to encourage households to visit grocery stores:
Implication 1 : When a grocery store opens closer to the household (t′g < tg), the
household is more likely to visit the grocery store than before the new store opened.
Implication 2 : When the household’s food budget increases (Y + ∆Y > Y ), the impact
on the probability of visiting the grocery store vs. the convenience store depends on
8We assume that labor supply decisions, and therefore the allocations T and Y , are fixed in this
single period.
9For notational convenience, in the lower stage we suppress the additive stochastic term.
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what the household does with the extra money ∆Y , and the net impact is ambiguous.
To be more concrete, we can define the opportunity cost of going to the grocery store
given ∆Y as the utility from the extra candy bars that the household would have bought
at the convenience store relative to the grocery store, and the opportunity cost of going
to the convenience store as the utility from the extra kale that could be bought using
∆Y . The household will be more likely to go to the grocery store if the opportunity
cost of going to the grocery store is less than the opportunity cost of going to the
convenience store. However, if the household would use ∆Y to buy more candy bars at
the grocery store than they would at the convenience store, receiving the extra resources
will unambiguously increase the probability of visiting the grocery store. This could be
the case, for example, if convenience store food is significantly more expensive than the
equivalent grocery store food. Previous studies have found that convenience store food
is at least 10 percent (Broda et al., 2009) and up to 50 percent (Caspi et al., 2017) more
expensive than comparable grocery store food, suggesting that this is a real possibility.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Dataset
We use administrative data containing the universe of SNAP transactions for all SNAP
participants in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area for the period October
2007 - September 2010. Our data consist of 133,548,882 unique transactions from
71,256 households. For each transaction we observe the amount, the date, and the store
name and address. We also observe monthly information on each household, including
household age and racial composition, car ownership, and the household’s street address.
In order to describe each household’s food retail environment, we geocode each household
and store address.10,11 For tractability we collapse these transaction-level data to a
monthly12 summary of transactions for each household. These data allow us to describe
1097 percent of household addresses are geocodable. The ungeocodable addresses are homeless
households with no address, and addresses with mistakes. Due to the number of addresses, we do not
correct all household address mistakes. A few households report as their address their county SNAP
office. We compare addresses to a list of county offices and treat such households as ungeocodable.
11100 percent of the store addresses within a two-county buffer of our metropolitan area are geocodable.
12What we refer to as“month” throughout this paper is the household’s benefit month, defined as the
period of time between the first benefit receipt in a calendar month and the first benefit receipt in the
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both the household’s store format choices as well as the set of stores to which a household
had access. The average household is in our data for 12 months and makes seven
transactions per benefit month.
For our regression analyses our initial household-month sample size is 1,910,437. We
drop from the sample households who ever had an ungeocodable address or multiple
addresses in one month (806,202 household-months).13 To restrict our analysis to urban
settings, we further drop from our sample households who lived in rural census tracts
at any point (61,283 household-months). A few households had conflicting data on the
number of household members,14 and are excluded from our final sample as well (1,453
household-months). Given uncertainty as to the validity of the given address, we also
take out of our sample households that have a homeless household member at some
point during the time that they are observed in our data (60,120 household-months).
Key to part of our identification strategy,15 we also exclude household-months with
missing data for our constructed census-tract level variables (65,120 household-months)
and households that moved residences during the period that we observe them (228,062
household-months). Finally, to mitigate endogenous selection into samples defined over
car ownership, we also exclude households whose car ownership status changed at some
point (67,575 household-months).16 Our final total household-month sample size is
620,622, to which we merge summary statistics of each household-month’s transactions.
An important first step is to use the store name and location to define store formats.
We choose a scheme that enables us to distinguish between formats with different
expected assortment of healthy foods, based on the results of previous studies, without
requiring detailed data on store size and stocking. Convenience stores, the format least
likely to stock healthy food options such as fresh fruits and vegetables, include corner
next calendar month. This definition allows for a standard “month” definition for months in which a
household receives benefits more than once, as well as months in which a household’s benefit receipt
schedule is different from the previous or next month. Both of these situations happen for administrative
reasons. In our analysis we control for the length of the benefit month as well as the number of benefit
issuances in that benefit month.
13Multiple address listings can occur when a household moves and each address is valid at some point
during the month in which the move occurs.
14Specifically, the number of eligible household members did not match the number of members of the
household in the demographic data.
15See Section 2.4.2.
16A change in car ownership status is defined as switching from owning any car to not owning any car,
or vice versa.
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stores, gas-marts, pharmacies, and dollar stores. This definition matches that of Stern
et al. (2016), Caspi et al. (2016), and Cannuscio et al. (2013), all of whom find that
stocking and purchases at these stores are significantly less healthy than at other stores.
Grocery stores are more likely to stock healthier food options, and include all grocery
stores, superstores, supercenters, mass merchandisers, and club stores.17 The grocery
store format is most likely to stock healthier food options (Glanz et al., 2007; Cannuscio
et al., 2013; Leone et al., 2011; Handbury et al., 2016) and shopping at grocery stores
is associated with healthier purchases (Stern et al., 2016; Volpe et al., 2017). Discount
stores consist of limited assortment stores, primarily Aldi. We separate these stores from
grocery stores because they offer a narrower assortment of all foods, including healthy
foods, than grocery stores, and there is some indication that they offer less healthy foods
on average than more traditional grocery store formats (Black et al., 2014). We classify
any Hispanic, Asian, or East African store or market as Ethnic stores. Ethnic stores
often have a mixture of grocery store and convenience store properties: they are often
smaller than grocery stores, and have more limited assortment, but may also sell fresh
fruits and vegetables. All other stores such as cooperatives, natural food stores, butchers,
bakeries, and farmers markets are classified as Other. Food purchased from Ethnic and
Other store formats may be as healthy as purchases from grocery stores (Stern et al.,
2016).
We also use the transaction data to define the availability of each store to SNAP
participants over time.18 One source of concern is that the universe of SNAP authorized
stores may not adequately characterize the food retail environment. While SNAP store
availability is important for our outcomes describing how households spend SNAP
benefits, there may be other stores not authorized to accept SNAP that should be
considered part of the household retail food environment. We do not include non-SNAP
stores in our analysis, but we can characterize the share of total stores that we observe
as SNAP stores. In Appendix A.3 we compare the counts of SNAP-authorized stores
to counts from the County Business Patterns for the 11 Minnesota counties covered by
17While mass merchandisers may stock less healthy foods than grocery stores, it was often difficult
in our data to distinguish between mass merchandisers and supercenters since most mass merchandise
stores have been converted into supercenters. We do not have the necessary information on the date of
conversion for each store.
18See Appendix A.3 for more information on how we define store availability.
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our data. SNAP stores account for between 80 to 100 percent of the total establishment
counts in the most urban counties, where most of our SNAP participants live. Caspi
et al. (2015) survey small, non-traditional stores including corner stores, gas-marts,
pharmacies and dollar stores in the Minneapolis-St Paul metropolitan area, and report
that between 70 percent (corner stores) and 100 percent (dollar stores) accept SNAP
benefits. If these non-traditional stores are less likely to accept SNAP benefits than
more traditional store formats, we would expect at least 70 percent of total stores would
be authorized to accept SNAP.
2.3.2 Grocery store openings
In order to quantify the impact of store openings on households, we require a time-varying
measure of each household’s food retail environment. We choose two complementary
methods to define household proximity to stores of a particular format. First, we
leverage knowledge of the precise location of each household and store to specify a series
of overlapping indicators for whether a household has a store within 0.5 (D05), 1 (D10),
and 1.5 (D15) miles. The 0.5 and 1 mile indicators follow the access definitions used
by the USDA Food Access Research Atlas data for urban areas. Figure ?? illustrates
the indicators for households relative to a grocery store opening. The indicators split
households into four types, which we label households A-D. Household A is within 0.5
miles of the grocery store opening, and each indicator is equal to one. Household B is
within 1 mile, but not within 0.5 miles, of the opening, and so D05 = 0 while D10 = 1
and D15 = 1. Similarly, household C is within 1.5 miles but not within 1 mile (or 0.5
miles), so D05 = 0, D10 = 0 and D15 = 1. Finally, household D is further than 1.5
miles, so all of the indicators are equal to zero.
While the indicators allow us to observe the impact of access to stores within 1.5
miles of a store opening, households often do not shop at the closest grocery store (Ver
Ploeg et al., 2015) and so the food retail environment within 1.5 miles may be a poor
measure of household access to stores. We therefore examine the robustness of our results
using a continuous measure of access. For the continuous measure, we follow common
measures in the accessibility literature (Bhat et al., 2000) and define a distance-weighted
12






where dhs is the Euclidean distance
19 between household h and store s. Our baseline
value for θ is 1/2.20
For most households in our data, the grocery store format index varies between
6-16, with higher values indicating greater store concentrations. The mean grocery
store concentration index is 12, and the mean convenience store index is 17, showing
that on average households have a greater concentration of convenience stores close
to their house. The average grocery store index in food desert tracts21 is 11.7, and
the average grocery store index in non-food desert tracts is 12.2, so consistent with
our expectation households in food deserts have lower grocery store concentrations.
The average convenience store index in food desert tracts is 17.3, while the average
convenience store index in non-food desert tracts is 17.7. Thus households in food deserts
also on average experience lower concentrations of convenience stores in the vicinity of
the house.
To illustrate the relationships between the two measures, Figure 2.1 shows a nonpara-
metric regression of the grocery store index on the distance to the nearest grocery store.
Vertical lines on the figure show distances of 0.5, 1, and 1.5 miles to the closest grocery
store, which correspond to the distances we use to define our overlapping indicators. The
difference between having a grocery store located immediately adjacent and having the
closest grocery store located 0.5 miles away is 4: the highest value of the concentration
index is 16, and is 12 for households 0.5 miles away from the closest grocery store.
Between 0.5 and 1, and 1 and 1.5, the concentration index experiences smaller decreases
that persist through 4 miles.
19While Euclidean distance is not necessarily the same as travel time, in our data they are practically
identical: the correlation coefficient between Euclidean distance and travel time as calculated by ArcGIS
is 0.98.
20We also check robustness to values of θ and other definitions of the kernel in Appendix ??. Handbury
et al., for example, use a Gaussian kernel to define an index of accessibility to grocery stores. Our index
definition is more robust to the choice of parameters than the Gaussian index, as seen in Appendix A.4.
Khuang (2017) provides an example of our preferred index definition from the economics literature.
21Low-income, low-access tracts as defined by the USDA ERS.
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2.3.3 Increasing resources
We require a change in household SNAP resources to measure the impact of increasing
household resources. We leverage two national SNAP policy changes which increased
benefits for all households. The first policy change during the period of our data was
a cost-of-living (COL) adjustment, which occured in October 2008. The second and
change largest occured on April 1, 2009, when the maximum SNAP benefit available
increased by 13.6 percent due to a provision of the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act (ARRA). The ARRA was passed by Congress in response to the recession, and the
goals of the SNAP portion of the ARRA were to improve the food security of low-income
households and stimulate the economy (USDA, 2010).22 Figure 2.2 shows average benefit
levels between October 2007 and September 2010 for our dataset, along with the 5th and
95th percentiles. The dotted black lines delineate October 2008 and April 2009. Average
benefit levels jumped by about $40 per household due to the ARRA, and about half as
much for the COL adjustment.
Using information on each household’s current benefit level as well as their household
size and income, we define the variable Benefit Increase as the actual benefits received
in a month less the benefits that the household would have received under pre-COL
SNAP policy. Benefit Increase therefore measures the increase in benefits attributable
solely to policy changes and not to changes in the household’s income or size.
2.3.4 Shopping at formats
To describe a household’s choice of store format we use two outcome measures. First,
we construct the percent of monthly SNAP expenditures that a household redeems at
each store format.23 Since total spending at each format can increase with a boost in
resources, our secondary outcome measure is the total amount of expenditures at each
store format.
22Prior to the ARRA, cost-of-living adjustments occured annually. After the ARRA, cost-of-living
adjustments were suspended for the remainder of the period of our data.
23While we could use either the share of trips or share of expenditures at a store format as our
dependent variable, we focus on share of expenditures to facilitate comparisons with previous studies.
Our results are robust to using trips shares.
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2.3.5 Summary statistics
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics on household demographics, store concentration,
and the household’s census tract of residence for household-months greater than 1.5
miles, between 1 and 1.5 miles, between 0.5 and 1 mile, and less than 0.5 miles from
the nearest grocery store.24 Households closer to grocery stores are on average slightly
smaller and have lower incomes,25 though the relationship with income is non-monotonic
- households within 0.5 miles of a grocery store have higher incomes than those just over
0.5 miles.
Table 2.2 displays average outcomes for the same samples of households by distance
to the nearest grocery store. Households generally redeem between 60 and 70 percent
of monthly SNAP expenditures at grocery stores. Within 1.5 miles of a grocery store,
households closest to the grocery store redeem relatively more at grocery stores. Outside
of a 1.5 mile radius of a grocery store, households redeem almost as high a percent at
grocery stores as those within 0.5 miles. We observe the opposite pattern for convenience,
discount, and ethnic store format expenditure shares: Households over 1.5 miles from a
grocery store redeem relatively smaller amounts at each format, while within 1.5 miles
of a grocery store, the format SNAP expenditure share is larger and decreases over
distance to the grocery store. Although within 1.5 miles of a grocery store the percent
of SNAP expenditures at grocery stores substantially increases, the total amount of
SNAP expenditures does not experience much increase. Households within 1.5 miles
of a grocery store on average redeem over $20 less at grocery stores than households
further from grocery stores. Much of this discrepancy is made up by households within
1.5 miles of a grocery store redeeming more at ethnic stores.
24To facilitate comparison we make the distances mutually exclusive in Table 2.1, even though our
indicator measures of store proximity are overlapping and not mutually exclusive.
25While our data do not include household income directly, we are able to infer income from its
authorized benefit amount. This amount is a function of the maximum benefit level and the household’s
monthly income net of SNAP deductions. Using the standard SNAP benefit formula and information on
the maximum benefit over time from the Food and Nutrition Service, we calculate the household’s net
income. About 29% of our sample has no net income; households with some income receive on average
$538 in monthly net income. Note that this amount is net of allowable SNAP deductions. We do not
have information on specific deductions, so we are unable to calculate the household’s gross income
which would be substantially higher than the net income.
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2.4 Empirical strategy
2.4.1 General empirical strategy
Our primary specification models household h’s shopping outcome for format f in
month t as a function of access to each store format
∑5
f=1Ahtf , the increase in benefits
due to policy changes Benefit Increaseht, time-varying household demographics Zht,




Ahtf + δBenefit Increaseht + θZht + τt + εh + εht. (2.1)
As explained in Section 2.3.2, access Ahtf is defined in two ways:
Ahtf = ηfIhtf (2.2)
where Ihtf is the continuous concentration index as defined in Section ??, or the series
of discrete indicators
Ahtf = αfD05htf + βfD10htf + γfD15htf (2.3)
where D05, D10, and D15 are the indicators as defined in Section ??. Since the indicators
are not mutually exclusive, the total impact of having a store within 0.5 miles (relative
to having a store greater than 1.5 miles away) is α+ β + γ.
Zht includes controls for household size, household racial composition (black, white,
and other), household age composition (percent under 18, percent 18-30, percent 31-
45, percent 46-65, percent 66-81, percent over 81), whether the household is headed
by a single parent, household vehicle ownership (whether the household owns one
car/motorcycle and whether the household owns more than one car/motorcycle), income,
the household’s monthly benefit amount, the length of the benefit month, the number
of times in the benefit month the household was issued benefits, and the cumulative
number of consecutive benefit months that we observe the household receiving SNAP
benefits.26
26The number of consecutive months is therefore specific to each spell that the household is on SNAP.
For households with one spell on SNAP, the number of consecutive months is just the total number of
16
Given the potential importance of car ownership in decreasing the time needed to
travel to a store, we present results split by household car ownership.
2.4.2 Identification of access coefficients
To measure the causal impact of increasing access to grocery stores and increasing
resources, our coefficients of interest are the grocery store access coefficients η or α, β,
and γ, and the benefit increase coefficient δ. The ideal experiment would have grocery
stores open in random months and neighborhoods throughout our city and sample period.
This is clearly infeasible, so we rely on actual store openings and closings to estimate
the impact of grocery store access. Household-level variation in grocery store supply
can theoretically come from two sources: changes in household location, and grocery
store openings and closings. As noted in Section dataset, we exclude households that
move to remove the possibility of endogenous residential sorting, so the only variation
in access comes from changes in the locations of grocery stores. Identification of store
access parameters η (or α, β, and γ) requires the assumption that grocery store location
decisions are unrelated to changes household decisions on where to purchase food,
conditional on household fixed effects and the other controls. This assumption could be
violated in three major ways.
First, grocery stores could explicitly locate near households that are already increasing
their shopping at grocery stores. Conditioning on household fixed effects, grocery store
location decisions would have to be made in reference to specific households. Since this
is unlikely to be the case, we argue that grocery store location decisions are plausibly
not determined by changes in shopping behavior, conditional on household fixed effects.
A related problem that is separate from the identification of our access parameters arises
if stores locate near households that are more likely to change their shopping in the
future. While not affecting the identification of access changes, this would limit the
external validity of our results. We do not address this issue directly, but note that
this is primarily a concern if households are more likely to change their behavior due to
unobserved factors, which we discuss next.
months the household has been receiving SNAP up until that month. Households with more than one
spell on SNAP during our period will have more than one “first” consecutive months. This variable,
then, captures breaks in SNAP benefit receipt.
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The second way that our identifying assumption could be violated is if there are
unobserved factors influencing both changes in household shopping as well as grocery
store openings or closings. These unobserved factors could cause either household
location changes relative to grocery stores, or grocery store location changes relative to
household. Restricting models to households that do not move removes any variation in
household location that could be due to unobserved factors that also influence changes
in shopping behavior. More problematic is the possibility that stores could choose
to locate or close in areas where household food preferences are changing in specific
ways. Grocery stores may observe these changing shopping preferences and decide to
locate in that neighborhood. We address this potential threat to identification in a few
ways. Including household fixed effects as well as time-varying household characteristics
plausibly controls for many demographic characteristics that influence store location
decisions. We also include proxies for unobserved preference changes in the vicinity of
the household: one- and three-month lagged average store format expenditure shares for
the household’s census tract,27 the average income of SNAP participants in the tract,
and the percentage of SNAP participants in the tract.28
The final strategy to address unobserved factors utilizes the small variation in distance
to the nearest grocery store given by the indicators D05, D10, and D15. This strategy of
taking advantage of small variation in distances is similar to the one employed by Currie et
al. (2010) to identify the impact of fast food restaurants on obesity. Since the indicators
D05, D10, and D15 are overlapping, in Equation 2.1 each coefficient measures the
additional impact relative to the next-smallest distance. Identification of these variables
rests on the assumption that the exact location of grocery stores within 1.5 miles of a
household is determined by factors unrelated to changing household shopping behavior.
That is, within 1.5 miles of a household, the location of a grocery store is determined by
available land or infrastructure, the location of which is unrelated to that household’s
shopping decisions. This assumption allows stores to strategically locate to neighorhoods
but requires that the location of the stores within neighborhoods is (conditionally) as good
27The average tract shares for household i are calculated for all households j 6= i in the household’s
census tract so that the dependent variable is mechanically independent from the average tract shares.
We exclude from our sample households that are the only SNAP participants in their tract.
28The percentage of SNAP participants in a tract is the total number of participants from our
demographic data that live in the tract, divided by the 2010 Census tract population.
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as random. One can think of two households in a particular neighborhood: Household
A is within 0.5 miles of the new store opening and Household B is 1 mile away. Our
assumption allows the new grocery store to locate to this neighborhood (approximated
by the figure’s frame) based on changing neighborhood characteristics, but the reason
that the store opens closer to household A than household B has nothing to do with the
differences between household A’s and B’s unobserved characteristics. Instead, the store
locates closer to household A because for example that land was for sale at the right
time. Our assumption is that the timing and location of land coming up for sale in a
particular neighborhood is unrelated to differences between household A and household
B. Thus when we compare households A and B, the only difference between them is their
distances to the grocery store, not unobserved differences which would contaminate any
comparison. Note that our use of this identification assumption relies on our detailed
geographic data, and is perhaps less plausible for studies that measure access at a census
tract level or higher. While this assumption is intuitively plausible, and we report tests of
this assumption below, we also acknowledge that this strategy utilizes variation in small
distances around a grocery store and so might be a poor description of a household’s
food retail environment. Analyzing results from both the index and the indicators will
give a robust and comprehensive view of the impact of geographic access on household
shopping behavior, though we acknowledge that our case for the causal identification of
the indicators is stronger.
One final threat to identifying the access coefficients is systematic measurement
error. We believe that this is not a concern in our data due to our detailed location
information and our data processing procedure. The distance measures are based on
detailed coordinates derived from household and store addresses, so the only significant
measurement error would be any misreporting of addresses. Households addresses are
used for communications with the SNAP program, so there is a strong disincentive
to misreport addresses. Further, as described in Section 2.3.1, we exclude households
from our sample for whom there is ambiguity as to the validity of their address, i.e.
households who have had more than two addresses listed in a month and households
that ever had a homeless member are dropped. Stores within the state are required
by law to report their addresses to the program, creating a disincentive for stores to
misreport addresses. In addition, we performed online searches for most of the stores
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within a two-county buffer of our metropolitan area of interest and were able to confirm
their locations. Finally, as mentioned above, we were able to successfully geocode all of
the store addresses within the two-county buffer.
2.4.3 Identification of benefit increase coefficients
Identification of δ requires assuming that the timing and amount of the benefit changes
is not correlated with changes in trip shares, conditional on the observables. The first
potential threat to our identification of δ would result from changing household shopping
behavior directly causing benefit increases. Since the cost-of-living and ARRA benefit
increases were implemented as a national SNAP policy, changing preferences or shopping
patterns of any individual household had no impact on the timing of the increase. Further,
the benefit increases were not given in order to influence household store format choice.
The ARRA benefit increase was intended to counteract the effects of the recession on
low-income households by improving food security and stimulating the economy (USDA,
2010). The cost-of-living adjustment in October, 2008 was part of pre-ARRA annual
SNAP policy to adjust for increases in the cost of a set basket of foods. Reverse causality
seems unlikely to be a concern in estimating the impact of benefit increases on store
format choice.
The second threat is that there may be unobserved factors that influenced the
implementation of a benefit increase as well as influencing household shopping patterns.
One set of unobserved factors is other policy changes. There were two state SNAP
policy changes around the same time as the ARRA. In March 2009, the state introduced
six-month reporting, requiring households with earned income to report their earnings
only every six months instead of monthly. In January 2009, able-bodied adults without
dependents were waived from the work requirement, leading to an increase in the SNAP
caseload. Both policy changes made it plausibly easier for a household to obtain or stay
on SNAP. Within-household, though, it seems unlikely that they changed the incentives
for visiting a grocery store relative to other store formats.
We finally note that our data come from the period of the recession. To control for
differential impacts over time for various (observable) groups, in addition to household
demographic controls that account for any changing household composition due to the
recession, we include interactions between our control variables and a linear time trend.
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While this arguably mitigates some confounding influence of the recession, the time
period may limit the applicability of our conclusions to non-recessionary periods.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Opening grocery stores
Descriptive
We observe 22 instances of a grocery store opening, and 6 instances of a grocery store
closing. To begin, we examine the impact of changing the supply of grocery stores by
looking at a simple before-after comparison. To make this comparison, we restrict our
sample to households that gained a grocery store within one mile or within one half mile
of their location (and that had no grocery stores within the relevant distance beforehand).
We look at the average trip shares for the three months before and six months after
the store opening.29 253 households met these requirements for a grocery store opening
within one mile, and 66 households met these requirements for a grocery store opening
within 0.5 miles. Figure 2.3 shows the average expenditure shares for households with
a grocery store opening within one mile and Figure 2.4 shows the average expenditure
shares for households that experienced a grocery store opening within 0.5 miles. After the
grocery store opening, expenditure shares at grocery stores increased by 5-10 percentage
points, and shares at ethnic stores most notably decreased.
Impact of grocery store access on store format expenditure shares
Table 2.3 shows the results from using Equation 2.1 to measure the impact of changing
grocery store access on expenditure shares to all store formats. Panel A uses the
concentration indices to define household proximity to store formats. In Panel B, we
repeat the regressions from Panel A using a census tract centroid-based concentration
29We also require that households have transaction data for each of the three months before and 6
months after store opening, and that the household is not within three months of another store opening
or closing within the relevant distance.
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index instead of a household address-based index.30 The difference between the results
in Panel A and Panel B therefore illustrate the attenuation bias that arises from spatial
mismeasurement. Panel C of Table 2.3 presents the corresponding results using the
indicators for the presence of a grocery store within 0.5, 1, and 1.5 miles. Each of the
coefficients represents the impact on grocery store trip share relative to the next largest
distance. The cumulative effect of having a grocery store locate within 0.5 miles of a
household is shown below the indicators, along with the F-statistic of the test for no
cumulative impact.
An increase in proximity to grocery stores increases the share of expenditures at
grocery stores in all specifications. There is evidence of significant attenuation bias for
the impact on households without cars when using tract-level instead of household-level
concentration indices: The coefficient on the grocery store and convenience store indices
decrease in absolute value by almost half when the location of households without cars is
approximated by the census tract centroid. The overall impacts of grocery store access
using the concentration indices, however, are modest: Moving a household from the
average food desert tract to the average non-food desert tract increases the share of
trips to grocery stores by only 0.4 percentage points for households with cars and 0.75
percentage points for households without cars. The indicators show that households
without cars are increasingly more responsive to a store opening within 1.5 miles as the
household gets closer to the store. Households within 0.5 miles of a store opening increase
their share of expenditures at grocery stores by almost 6 percentage points relative to
all households within 1 mile of the grocery store opening. Similarly, households within 1
mile of a grocery store opening increase their share of expenditures at grocery stores by
2.4 percentage points relative to households just within 1.5 miles from the grocery store
opening. This implies a cumulative impact of a grocery store opening for households
without cars of 8 percentage points. Households with cars are not similarly impacted by
getting closer to a store opening within 1.5 miles, although overall households within 1.5
miles of a store opening do increase their share of expenditures at grocery stores by 2.1






where dcs is the Euclidean distance between the household’s tract centroid c and store s.
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percentage points relative to households over 1.5 miles away from the store.
In response to a grocery store opening, convenience store shopping decreases. The
coefficient on the household grocery store index suggests that when considering the
broader food retail environment most of the increase in grocery store expenditures
comes at the expense of convenience store expenditures. The indicators tell a more
complicated story. Within 1.5 miles of a grocery store opening, households without cars
substitute away from convenience stores increasingly more. For example, households
without cars within 0.5 miles of a store opening thus shop less at convenience stores than
households just within 1 mile by 2.7 percentage points. However, households within 1.5
miles overall actually increase shopping at convenience stores by relative to households
greater than 1.5 miles away. Cumulatively, there is little impact of a grocery store
opening on convenience store shopping at 0.5 miles from the grocery store. Instead, the
largest decrease in format shares comes from ethnic stores. All households within 1.5
miles of the grocery store shop less at ethnic stores by 2-3 percentage points relative to
households over 1.5 miles away, and the impact gets larger as the household gets closer
to the grocrey store. The indicators also provide some evidence that a grocery store
opening takes away from discount store expenditures for households with cars.
We can compare these results to those of Allcott et al. (2017), who find that
households with an income under $25,000 increase grocery store expenditure share by
approximately 1 percentage point when a store opens within 10 minutes of the household.
Our grocery store concentration index results broadly support Allcott et al.’s finding,
and our indicator results for households with cars could be interpreted as close to Allcott
et al.’s. Households without cars, however, cumulatively increase their grocery store
expenditure share by 8 percentage points when a grocery store opens within 0.5 miles,
which is substantially larger than Allcott et al.’s result. Since two-thirds of our urban
population of SNAP participants do not own cars,31 their behavior could substantially
influence the effectiveness of food policy designed for urban areas. In addition, households
without cars are twice as likely to be elderly32 and almost twice as likely to be the only
3163 percent of the overall sample do not own cars. See Table 2.1 for this over distance to grocery
store.
3215 percent of households without cars have someone in the households over 65, compared to 8 percent
of car owners.
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person in the household,33 suggesting they may face additional constraints to accessing
healthy food.
2.5.2 Impact of grocery store access on store format SNAP redempti-
ons
In this section we present the results from using total SNAP expenditures at each
store format as the outcome in Equation 2.1 (Table 2.4). Households with cars increase
redemptions at grocery stores due to a greater supply of grocery stores - the concentration
index coefficient implies that moving from the average food desert to average non-food
desert tract would increase household SNAP expenditures at grocery stores by $1.6
per month on average. Households with cars that live within 1.5 miles spend over $6
more at grocery stores due to a grocery store opening. As seen in the previous section,
discount store and ethnic store SNAP expenditures drop as a result of a grocery store
opening. There is weak evidence that households with cars actually increase the amount
spent at convenience stores due to a grocery store opening. Households without cars
also spend more at grocery stores - within 0.5 miles, they spend cumulatively over $8
more at grocery stores. For households without cars within 1.5 miles of the grocery store
opening, this comes at the expense primarily of ethnic stores.
Placebo tests
We test our identifying assumptions underpinning the grocery store access analysis in
three ways displayed in Table 2.5. First, we ask whether our grocery store access measures
predict household characteristics, conditional on household fixed effects and our time-
varying variables. If our measures are not conditionally correlated with unobservables, we
would expect that they would not predict household demographics in these regressions.
In our summary statistics in Section 2.3.5, we observed that income varied most clearly
with distance to the nearest grocery store. In addition, it is likely that stores would
locate in order to be close to households that can afford their products. We therefore
run models that relate our access measures to household-month net income Incomeht,
3374 percent of households without cars have only one person in the household, compared to 40 percent
of car owners.
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Ahtf + θZht + τt + εh + εht, (2.4)
Column 1 uses the grocery store indicators αfD05htf + βfD10htf + γfD15htf to predict
household income, and column 2 uses the grocery store concentration index. Neither
grocery store access measure is significantly related to income changes.
Our second test asks whether our primary outcome of interest - expenditure share to
grocery stores - predicts our grocery store access measures, conditional on observables
and household fixed effects. If grocery store supply is assocated with unobservables, we
would expect the grocery store expenditure share to significantly predict a household’s
supply of grocery stores. For this test, we regress grocery store access Ahtg on grocery
store expenditure shares shtg and household fixed effects and other demographics:
Ahtg = αshtg + θZht + τt + εh + εht, (2.5)
Column 3 shows the results of this regression using the grocery store concentration index
as Ahtg, column 4 uses D05htf as Ahtg and conditions on the other distance indicators,
and column 5 uses D10htf as Ahtg and conditions on the other distance indicators.
Grocery store expenditure share has a precisely estimated but very small relationship
with grocery store supply.
Our final test asks whether future grocery store supply predicts grocery store trip
share. We define future grocery store supply at month t as the concentration index or
distance indicators at t+3. Conditional on observables, fixed effects, and current grocery
store supply, if our identifying assumption is correct we expect future store supply to
be uncorrelated with current grocery store trip share. Our final placebo regressions are







Ah,t+3,f + θZh,t + τt + εh + εh,t. (2.6)
Columm 6 uses the access indices and column 7 uses the access indicators. We only
34The benefit increase is included in Zht.
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display the relevant coefficients for grocery store access, though access measures for all
store formats are included. While current supply displays a clear relationship (at least
in the case of the indicators), the relationship with future grocery store supply is an
order of magnitude smaller and in all cases statistically insignificant.35 Taken as a whole
or individually, our robustness checks support our identifying assumptions.
2.5.3 Increasing resources
Descriptive
Figure 2.5 shows the average total monthly expenditures for each format over time, along
with the share of expenditures at grocery stores. Vertical lines on the figure indicate
the COL and ARRA benefit increase months. Expenditures increased for all formats as
a result of the ARRA, with smaller increases due to the COL change. There is little
indication, however, that the grocery store share changed as a result of the benefit
increases.
Impact of increasing resources
Table 2.6 shows the coefficient of Benefit Increaseht for regressions following Equation
2.1. Panel A uses expenditure shares as the outcome, and Panel B uses total format
expenditures. In Panel A we see that SNAP benefit increases lead to larger shares of
expenditures at grocery stores. An extra $100 in benefits would lead to 2.1 percentage
points higher grocery store expenditure shares for households without cars. This is
primarily offset by drops in the share at convenience stores, which decrease by 1.4
percentage points for households without cars. Giving households with cars leads to
smaller effects but in the same directions. As suggested by the average amounts of
expenditures at each store format (Table 2.1), Panel B shows that most of the extra
benefits were spent in grocery stores, followed by ethnic stores. Households without cars
do, however, also increase spending at convenience stores by a statistically significant
$5.2.
We see in Table 2.6 that households increase spending at all store formats when
given extra benefits, as would be expected. The larger question is whether this increase
35We obtain qualitatively similar results if we measure future store supply at t+ 1 and t+ 2.
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is smaller or larger than we would expect. To examine this question, we compare the
percentage of extra spending36 at each store format to the corresponding budget share
in Tables 2.7 and 2.8. Car owners spend less of the extra benefits than we would expect
at grocery stores and substantially more than we would expect at ethnic stores. Though
the dollar amount is small, these households also spend twice as much as expected at
“Other” stores. In contrast, households without a car spend more than we would expect
at grocery stores, and less at convenience stores. Households without a car display far
smaller differences between the extra spending induced by the benefit increase and what
we would expect from average budget shares, though they also spend twice as much at
“Other” stores than expected.
2.6 Comparison of supply-side and demand-side policies
In Section 2.5.1 we observed that a grocery store opening increased total and relative
spending at grocery stores and decreased shopping at ethnic stores, but had an ambiguous
impact on convenience store shopping. There is some indication from the concentration
index that households without cars shop less at convenience stores, but this is tempered
by the observation that within 1.5 miles of a grocery store opening, households actually
shop more at convenience stores (relative to outside of 1.5 miles of a grocery store).
This counterintuitive result disappears for households within 0.5 miles of a grocery store
opening. A grocery store opening within 1.5 miles leads households to shop less mainly
at ethnic stores.
When households receive more resources, we saw in Section 2.5.3 that the share of
expenditures at grocery stores increases and the share at convenience stores decreases.
This impact is largest for households without cars, who also use the extra resources
to spend $5.2 more at convenience stores. Car owners spend the extra resources in
unexpected ways - far more is spent at ethnic stores and substantially less is spent at
grocery stores than we would predict from average budget shares.
The desirability of either policy will depend on the intended change in shopping
behavior. If the goal of policy is simply to shift shares of household spending away
36The amount of extra spending is the coefficient from Panel B in Table 2.6. The percentage of extra
spending is this coefficient divided by the sum of all coefficients in Panel B.
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from convenience stores and towards grocery stores, giving households extra benefits
unambiguously accomplishes this goal. Howevever, total spending at convenience stores
does increase for households without cars, and the impact of this policy on car owners
depends on how they use the extra resources at ethnic stores. We can also quantify
the tradeoffs between the policies. A grocery store opening within 0.5 miles increased
the share of expenditures at grocery stores for households without cars by 8 percentage
points and households with cars by 3.9 percentage points (relative to no store within
1.5 miles). The same policy would increase the amount spent at grocery stores by $8.4
per month for households without cars and $6.3 per month for households with cars.
Giving households more resources lead to 2.1 percentage point increase in grocery store
expenditure share for households without cars and a 0.3 percentage point increase for
households with cars. Therefore, in order to have the same impact on grocery store
shares as opening a grocery store within 0.5 miles of a household, we would have to give
households without cars $381 and households with cars $1,300 more per month. On the
other hand, to have the same impact on total grocery store expenditures, we would have
to give households without cars $14.3 and households with cars $19.5.
2.7 Discussion and conclusion
This paper measures the impact on store format choice of changing household access
to grocery stores and increasing household resources. We also estimate the impact of
changing household convenience store access, which we compare with the impact of the
supply and demand policies. We find that opening a grocery store near a household leads
to an increase in shopping at grocery stores versus other store formats but little change
in shopping at convenience stores. Instead, a grocery store opening reduces shopping at
discount and ethnic stores. The impact is concentrated among households within 0.5
miles of the grocery store that do not own a car.
In response to receiving more resources, we find that households increase their share
of expenditures at grocery stores and decrease their share of expenditures at convenience
stores. Total expenditures at all store formats increase, and in particular households
without cars spent more at convenience stores. While households without cars spend
the extra resources broadly as we would expect given average budget shares, car owners
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show greater flexibility and spend far more than expected at ethnic stores and less than
expected at grocery stores.
Using our results, we are able to compare policies and quantify some of the tradeoffs
between polices. Giving households more resources unambiguously shifts spending shares
away from convenience stores and towards grocery stores - unlike opening grocery stores
- but also results in more total spending at convenience stores and much more spending
at ethnic stores than we would expect for households with cars. The amount of extra
resources needed to have the same impact as a grocery store opening within 0.5 miles
varies substantially by car ownership, and is far smaller if the goal of policy is simply to
increase total spending at grocery stores instead of the share of expenditures at grocery
stores.
We note here a few limitations of our analysis. Since our data only cover three years,
and most households are observed for shorter periods, our results can be thought of as
measuring the potential short-term impact on household behavior of policies to improve
access to grocery stores. Households would plausibly switch purchases from other grocery
stores to the closer store. If this keeps the closer store economically viable, it is possible
that this could lead to long-term changes in preferences as households are exposed more
frequently to a grocery store format. The extent to which this happens, and the time
frame, could be a fruitful avenue for further research with different data. In addition, our
data consist only of SNAP transactions. Since SNAP transactions consitute on average
67% of a household’s total monthly food expenditures,37 understanding how households
spend their SNAP benefits gives us insight into a large portion of SNAP household food
spending, but admittedly not all of the household’s food spending. Given the nature of
SNAP administrative data, we are unable to observe what specific items that households
purchase. Finally, our data are from the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area for a
two-year period. This might limit the external validity of our results.
Our results bring up a number of directions for further investigation. We find that
a grocery store opening leads to more shopping at convenience stores. Understanding
why this would be the case, and for whom, could provide important information on the
tradeoffs households make when deciding between retail food store formats. Ethnic stores
appear to play an important role in the food shopping behavior of SNAP participants
37Authors’ calculations based on data from the Current Population Survey for years 2004-2013.
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in our city, and households with cars prefer to use extra resources at ethnic stores
more than any other store format. Further understanding the role of ethnic stores
in the food purchasing behavior of low-income households would be important in
understanding how households choose to acquire food.38 We also have documented
substantial differences in shopping behavior between car owners and households that
do not own cars. Given the substantial number of urban SNAP participants who do
not own cars, a greater understanding of these differences has potentially significant
implications for the effectiveness of many policies that aim to change the shopping
behavior of low-income households.
2.8 Figures and Tables
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38While spending at ethnic stores in Minneapolis-St. Paul is high, previous research has suggested
significant roles for ethnic stores also in Chicago (Block, 2006) and San Diego (Joassart-Marcell et al.,
2017).
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The central line depicts the average benefit level over time. The top dotted line displays
the 95th percentile of benefit levels, and the bottom dotted line displays the 5th percentile
of benefit levels over time.
31
























-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6




























-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6




































































Table 2.1: Summary statistics of control variables by distance to nearest grocery store
>1.5 mi 1 - 1.5 mi 0.5 - 1 mi <0.5 mi
Household size 2.12 2.02 1.98 1.94
White 0.55 0.42 0.44 0.49
Black 0.22 0.35 0.30 0.30
Hispanic 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04
Other race 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.17
% under 18 years old 24.44 22.97 22.61 22.35
% between 18 and 30 years old 15.85 18.09 17.82 16.95
% between 31 and 45 years old 18.49 18.33 18.54 17.95
% between 46 and 65 years old 31.79 32.05 33.34 32.01
% between 66 and 80 years old 7.59 7.11 6.15 8.24
% over 80 years old 1.84 1.41 1.52 2.48
Whether single parent household 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.20
Household has no car 0.55 0.64 0.65 0.66
Household has 1 car 0.33 0.28 0.27 0.27
Household has more than 1 car 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.07
SNAP net income ($) 391.46 375.88 357.88 379.77
Length of benefit month (days) 30.08 30.10 30.09 30.10
Number of benefit issuances 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02
Consecutive number of months on SNAP 8.92 9.40 9.47 9.67
Convenience index 14.13 18.18 18.78 18.13
Grocery index 10.20 11.55 12.10 13.14
Discount index 6.36 7.15 7.12 7.00
Ethnic index 10.20 15.00 15.30 14.68
Other index 9.54 11.64 12.17 11.96
Census tract mean income 384.22 367.61 351.97 360.49
Census tract % SNAP participants 2.90 4.61 4.21 3.90
Continued on next page
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics of control variables by distance to nearest grocery store
>1.5 mi 1 - 1.5 mi 0.5 - 1 mi <0.5 mi
N 66465 167568 241970 144619
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics of store format expenditure shares by distance to nearest
grocery store
>1.5 mi 1 - 1.5 mi 0.5 - 1 mi <0.5 mi
A. Expenditure shares (%)
Convenience 6.40 9.23 7.75 7.32
Grocery 71.27 63.60 67.08 71.74
Discount 7.86 8.85 7.72 7.08
Ethnic 11.33 14.31 12.93 10.23
Other 1.92 2.69 3.06 2.33
N 66465 167568 241970 144619
B. Total expenditures ($)
Convenience 11.41 15.05 14.14 12.92
Grocery 170.24 145.15 148.68 148.60
Discount 15.85 17.45 15.96 13.82
Ethnic 24.90 35.55 33.03 26.13
Other 4.86 6.26 7.40 5.99
N 66465 167568 241970 144619
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Table 2.3: Impact on store format expenditure shares of changing access to grocery
stores
Grocery Conv. Discount Ethnic Other
C NC C NC C NC C NC C NC
A. Grocery store index - household
Index 0.8** 1.5*** 0.3 -1.1*** -0.3 0.02 -0.5** -0.7*** -0.3* 0.03
(0.4) (0.5) (0.2) (0.4) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1)
B. Grocery store index - tract
Index 0.8** 0.8* 0.4* -0.7** -0.2 0.2 -0.6** -0.5** -0.3* 0.02
(0.4) (0.4) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.2) (0.1)
C. Grocery store indicators
I(0.5 miles) 0.9 5.8*** -0.1 -2.7** 0.1 -1.6** -1.7 -1.6** 0.6 -0.02
(1.3) (1.3) (1.0) (1.2) (0.7) (0.7) (1.1) (0.8) (0.5) (0.4)
I(1 mile) 0.9 2.4** -0.5 -2.1** 0.2 0.7 -0.2 -0.6 -0.3 0.1
(1.0) (1.1) (0.7) (1.0) (0.6) (0.6) (0.9) (0.6) (0.5) (0.3)
I(1.5 miles) 2.1* -0.2 2.0* 3.3*** -1.9** 0.004 -2.0** -3.3*** -0.5 -0.2
(1.3) (1.1) (1.1) (1.0) (0.8) (0.5) (1.0) (0.8) (0.5) (0.4)
Cumulative effect of opening within 0.5 miles
Effect 3.9** 8.0*** 1.4 -1.5 -1.7* -0.9 -3.8*** -5.5*** -0.2 -0.1
F-stat 5.6 27.6 1.5 1.0 3.0 1.0 6.9 27.5 0.08 0.02
N 224314 396308 224314 396308 224314 396308 224314 396308 224314 396308
Notes: C = Car; NC = No car. Each column of Panels A, B, and C is a different household fixed effect
regression of access and controls on the percent of expenditures at each store format as defined in the
text. I(0.5), I(1), and I(1.5) are indicators for the presence of a grocery store within 0.5, 1, and 1.5
miles, respectively. The cumulative effect at 0.5 miles is the percent increase on store format share of
having a store within 0.5 miles relative to 1.5 or more miles. The F-statistic is the test statistic for the
test that the cumulative effect at 0.5 miles equals zero. Standard errors are clustered at the household
level. In addition to the corresponding access measures to all other four store formats, regressions control
for month-year fixed effects, household size, household racial composition (black, Hispanic, and other),
household age composition (percent under 18, percent 18-30, percent 31-45, percent 46-65, percent 66-81,
percent over 81), whether the household is headed by a single parent, whether the household owns 0, 1,
or more cars/motorcycles, income, amount of benefits, the length of the benefit month, the number of
times in the benefit month the household was issued benefits, number of consecutive months on SNAP,
one- and three-month lagged tract average store format shares, mean tract income, and tract % SNAP
participants. Regressions also incude a interactions between a linear time trend and all control variables.
∗∗∗p < 0.01∗∗p < 0.05∗p < 0.1 38
Table 2.4: Impact on store format total expenditures of changing access to grocery stores
Grocery Conv. Discount Ethnic Other
C NC C NC C NC C NC C NC
A. Grocery store index - household
Index 3.2** 1.4 0.6 -0.6 -1.2* -0.4 -1.7 -0.2 -0.9 -0.4*
(1.5) (0.9) (0.8) (0.4) (0.6) (0.4) (1.2) (0.5) (0.7) (0.2)
B. Grocery store index - tract
Index 3.5** 0.9 1.2 -0.5 -1.3** -0.4 -2.5* -0.08 -1.1 -0.4
(1.7) (1.0) (1.1) (0.4) (0.7) (0.5) (1.4) (0.6) (0.9) (0.3)
C. Grocery store indicators
I(0.5 miles) -10.2** 6.0** -0.6 -1.8 0.9 -1.9 -1.0 -2.2* 2.1 -1.6
(5.1) (2.4) (2.3) (1.1) (1.6) (1.3) (4.3) (1.2) (1.4) (1.2)
I(1 mile) 10.2** 4.2** 1.3 -0.4 0.3 1.0 -2.1 -0.3 -2.1* -0.9
(4.9) (2.1) (2.3) (1.2) (1.6) (1.1) (3.8) (1.2) (1.1) (0.9)
I(1.5 miles) 6.3 -1.9 2.9 2.8* -3.8** -0.10 -2.0 -1.7 -1.3 0.9
(4.3) (2.3) (2.3) (1.4) (1.5) (1.0) (3.3) (1.5) (1.2) (0.8)
Cumulative effect of opening within 0.5 miles
Effect 6.3 8.4*** 3.6 0.6 -2.6 -1.0 -5.1 -4.1*** -1.4 -1.6
F-stat 1.6 13.6 1.6 0.2 1.6 0.8 1.5 8.0 0.7 1.7
N 224314 396308 224314 396308 224314 396308 224314 396308 224314 396308
Notes: C = Car; NC = No car. Each column of Panels A, B, and C is a different household fixed
effect regression of access and controls on the total amount spent at each store format as defined in the
text. I(0.5), I(1), and I(1.5) are indicators for the presence of a grocery store within 0.5, 1, and 1.5
miles, respectively. The cumulative effect at 0.5 miles is the percent increase on store format share of
having a store within 0.5 miles relative to 1.5 or more miles. The F-statistic is the test statistic for the
test that the cumulative effect at 0.5 miles equals zero. Standard errors are clustered at the household
level. In addition to the corresponding access measures to all other four store formats, regressions control
for month-year fixed effects, household size, household racial composition (black, Hispanic, and other),
household age composition (percent under 18, percent 18-30, percent 31-45, percent 46-65, percent 66-81,
percent over 81), whether the household is headed by a single parent, whether the household owns 0, 1,
or more cars/motorcycles, income, amount of benefits, the length of the benefit month, the number of
times in the benefit month the household was issued benefits, number of consecutive months on SNAP,
one- and three-month lagged tract average store format shares, mean tract income, and tract % SNAP
participants. Regressions also incude a interactions between a linear time trend and all control variables.
∗∗∗p < 0.01∗∗p < 0.05∗p < 0.1
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Table 2.5: Impact of grocery store access: Placebos
Dependent variables
Grocery store access
Inc ($10) Index I(0.5 miles) I(1 mile) Groc share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Groc share -0.00005 0.000004 0.00002*
(0.00004) (0.000008) (0.00001)
Groc index -0.03 1.2***
(0.1) (0.4)
Groc index in 3 mos. 0.3
(0.3)
I(0.5 miles) -0.8** 0.5*** 4.4***
(0.4) (0.03) (1.1)
I(1 mile) 0.06 0.3*** 1.3
(0.4) (0.02) (0.9)
I(1.5 miles) -0.09 0.06*** 0.4*** 0.3
(0.4) (0.02) (0.02) (0.9)
I(0.5 mi) in 3 mos. -0.1
(1.0)
I(1 mi) in 3 mos. 1.6*
(0.8)
I(1.5 mi) in 3 mos. -0.4
(0.9)
N 620622 620622 620622 620622 620622 505706 505706
Notes: Each column is a separate household fixed effect regression, with the sample restricted to
non-movers. I(0.5), I(1), and I(1.5) are indicators for the presence of a grocery store within 0.5, 1,
and 1.5 miles, respectively. Regressions control for month-year fixed effects, household size, household
racial composition (black, Hispanic, and other), household age composition (percent under 18, percent
18-30, percent 31-45, percent 46-65, percent 66-81, percent over 81), whether the household is headed
by a single parent, whether the household owns 0, 1, or more cars/motorcycles, amount of benefits, the
length of the benefit month, the number of times in the benefit month the household was issued benefits,
number of consecutive months on SNAP, one- and three-month lagged tract average store format
shares, mean tract income, and tract % SNAP participants. Regressions also incude a interactions
between a linear time trend and all control variables. Models 3-7 additionally control for income.
Models 1-2 and 6-7 control for access to other store formats. Standard errors are clustered at the
household level. ∗∗∗p < 0.01∗∗p < 0.05∗p < 0.1
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Table 2.6: Impact of benefit increase of $100 on all store format outcomes
Groc Conv Discount Ethnic Other
C NC C NC C NC C NC C NC
A. Expenditure share
Ben. incr. 0.3 2.1*** -0.5* -1.4*** -0.4 -0.6 0.2 0.09 0.3* -0.06
(0.5) (0.7) (0.3) (0.5) (0.3) (0.5) (0.3) (0.5) (0.2) (0.3)
B. Expenditure ($)
Ben. incr. 44.1***43.1***2.1 5.2*** 3.8***3.8*** 24.9***10.9***3.9***3.7***
(2.8) (2.9) (1.5) (1.5) (1.0) (1.4) (2.5) (2.1) (1.4) (1.3)
Notes: Each column is a different household fixed effect regression of access and controls on store
format-specific outcomes. Panel A shows the results for the expenditure share dependent variable,
Panel B shows the results for expenditure amount, Panel C shows the results for trip share, Panel
D shows the results for total number of trips, Panel E shows the results for average expenditure
per trip, and Panel F shows the results for average trip distance. Standard errors are clustered
at the household level. In addition to access indices for all store formats, regressions control for
month-year fixed effects, household size, household racial composition (black, Hispanic, and other),
household age composition (percent under 18, percent 18-30, percent 31-45, percent 46-65, percent
66-81, percent over 81), whether the household is headed by a single parent, whether the household
owns 0, 1, or more cars/motorcycles, income, the length of the benefit month, the number of times in
the benefit month the household was issued benefits, number of consecutive months on SNAP, one-
and three-month lagged tract average store format shares, mean tract income, and tract % SNAP
participants. Regressions also incude a interactions between a linear time trend and all control
variables. ∗∗∗p < 0.01∗∗p < 0.05∗p < 0.1
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Table 2.7: Comparison of extra spending with average budget share: Car owners
$ increase % of extra spending Budget share (%)
Grocery 44.1 56.0 74.3
Convenience 2.1 2.7 4.4
Discount 3.8 4.8 6.6
Ethnic 24.9 31.6 11.2
Other 3.9 4.9 2.6
Notes: This table compares the increase in spending at each store format
due to SNAP benefit increases to the average budget shares, for car owners.
The column “$ increase” shows the relevant coefficient from Table ??. The
next column shows this as a percent of the total increase in spending, defined
as the sum of the coefficients in the first column. The last column shows the
relevant average budget share from the data over all years.
Table 2.8: Comparison of extra spending with average budget share: Without car
$ increase % of extra spending Budget share (%)
Grocery 43.1 64.6 63.9
Convenience 5.2 7.8 9.9
Discount 3.8 5.7 8.6
Ethnic 10.9 16.3 13.2
Other 3.7 5.5 2.6
Notes: This table compares the increase in spending at each store format
due to SNAP benefit increases to the average budget shares, for households
without cars. The column “$ increase” shows the relevant coefficient from
Table ??. The next column shows this as a percent of the total increase in
spending, defined as the sum of the coefficients in the first column. The last
column shows the relevant average budget share from the data over all years.
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Chapter 3
The impact of access to food
retail stores on food assistance
spending over the month
3.1 Introduction
The different consumption patterns of poor households are often thought to contribute
to worse health, lower well-being, and even a lack of resources, compared to non-poor
households. Common explanations for divergent consumption behavior broadly suggest
that either poor individuals are rational and make the best decisions given their situations,
or that poor individuals make mistakes in decision-making that should be corrected for
by outside organizations such as government, or a little of both (Bertrand et al., 2004).1
One particular behavior that has attracted is the sensitivity of consumption - and food
consumption in particular - to the timing of income receipt. Previous research has
documented steep declines in food and other non-durable consumption between income
payments (Huffman and Barenstein, 2005; Stephens, 2006), Social Security payments
(Mastrobuoni and Weinberg, 2009; Stephens, 2003), and food assistance benefit payments
(Wilde and Ranney, 2000; Shapiro, 2005). Such lumpy consumption patterns - large
expenditures and consumption close to the day of payment which decline until the next
1Mullainathan and Shafir (2013) also suggest that resource scarcity itself can impede cognitive
functioning and so contribute to mistakes in decision-making.
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payment - has been linked to worse diet quality (Kuhn, 2017; Todd, 2015), poor health
such as acute hypoglycemia (Seligman et al., 2014), poor student test scores (Cottie et al.,
2016), financially-motivated crime (Foley, 2011), and can influence measurements of food
security (Gregory and Smith, 2018). Previous research has ruled out many explanations
that attribute this behavior to rational decisions on the part of the poor,2 and generally
concludes that sensitivity to payment timing is due to time-inconsistent preferences.3
One alternative hypothesis that could explain temporally lumpy consumption is that
transaction costs make multiple store trips infeasible.
In this paper, we test whether transaction costs contribute to the monthly food
expenditure cycle for a sample of households on the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP). Households spend time reaching grocery stores and carrying out food
shopping trips, and also spend money either on public transportation or gas for cars.
If households only have a specific amount of time in which to shop each month, or are
constrained in non-food expenditures such that there is only enough transportation
money for a set amount of shopping trips, households may make a rational decision to
lump all food expenditures into a few shopping trips. By the end of the month, the
household may have depleted its stock of food but due to a constrained time or money
budget be unable to make another grocery store shopping trip, causing the household to
either skip meals (Kuhn, 2017) or to increase purchases from convenience stores. Damon
et al. (2013) find evidence for this general pattern of substituting convenience store
purchases for grocery store purchases later in the month, which might help explain the
worsening diet quality. We specifically test the effect of two mechanisms which would be
expected to decrease transaction costs for food shopping trips: Proximity to a grocery
store, and access to a car.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to test whether the monthly
expenditure cycle for SNAP households is due to costs associated with traveling to
grocery stores, although this has clear and important implications for policy. One
commonly-suggested policy correction to lumpy food expenditures of SNAP households
2Such explanations include food spoilage, theft, and intra- and inter-household competition (Shapiro,
2005), and changes in food quality as well as intertemporal price differences (Hastings and Washington,
2010).
3Smith et al. (2016) examine the role of another behavioral mechanism - income fungibility - in
contributing to the food expenditure cycle for households on food assistance.
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is to provide smaller benefit amounts multiple times in a month. If the cycle is due to
short-run impatience - as suggested by Shapiro (2005) among others - multiple benefit
issuances in a month would help households by enforcing consumption smoothing. If the
cycle is due to difficulty in accessing grocery stores, providing benefits multiple times in
a month could impose extra travel or time costs on households already facing a shortage
of income and free time.
Only a few studies have examined a relationship between store access and consumption
smoothing over the month for households on SNAP. Wilde and Ranney (2000) use survey
and food intake data from the Continuing Survey of Food Intake by Individuals (CSFII)
and find that households that shop more frequently than once per month (“frequent”
shoppers) do not experience significant end-of-month drops in consumption compared
to households that only shop once in a month. They find that greater distance to the
primary grocery store decreases the probability of being a frequent shopper, though the
effect is small. On the other hand, Shapiro (2005) uses the same dataset and finds that
households with greater shopping frequency actually have greater declines in consumption.
Kuhn (2016) provides an analysis that is closest in spirit to our paper; he uses survey
and expenditure data from the United States Department of Agriculture’s FoodAPS
dataset and finds no relationship between the amount that expenditures decrease over
the month and travel time to the household’s primary grocery store. Of necessity, each
of these previous studies have relied on survey data with self-reported distance or travel
time to a primary store.
This paper makes five contributions. First, instead of relying on information about
a single primary store, we measure proximity to all food stores that accept SNAP
benefits in our area of interest. Second, while access and store choice are related, a
household’s choice of store includes considerations such as product variety and prices.
Thus measuring access to potential stores - as we are able to do - is more informative of
the impact of store proximity than the distance to a chosen store. Third, we leverage
information on households and stores over time to observe the impact of store openings
and closings. This lets us both address issues of the endogeneity of store proximity
as well as directly estimate the impact of changes to store proximity. Finally, we are
uniquely able to explore the impact of car ownership itself on the benefit expenditure
cycle, as well as how car ownership interacts with store access.
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To address this question we use a novel transaction-level and household administrative
state SNAP data. We have the universe of SNAP transactions - including benefit
disbursements - for the population of SNAP participants in the Minneapolis-St. Paul
metropolitan area over a period of two fiscal years. These transaction data importantly
include store’s precise locations. Additionally, we combine information on transactions to
household data, including precise household locations. The household and store locations
provided in these data let us describe a household’s proximity to grocery stores as well
as to any other store where households can spend SNAP benefits. These data then allow
us to relate the speed at which households spend SNAP benefits over a month to store
proximity.
Households that wish to shop more often at grocery stores may choose to locate
near these stores, which would confound our results. We account for this by focusing on
within-household variation in store access and restricting our sample to households that
do not move locations. This narrows any time series variation in store proximity to store
openings and closings. Stores, however, similarly choose where to locate, and may locate
near households with smoother (or less smooth) monthly expenditure patterns. They may
do so because they value certain expenditure patterns in themselves, or because these
patterns are related with other (unobservable) household characteristics. Looking at
within-household variation in store proximity, we account for store location decisions by
comparing households that differ by only small distances to the store opening (or closing).
Within the small distances we are able to observe, changing household unobservables are
plausibly exogenous to a store’s decision to locate near one household relative to another
household. This strategy allows us to measure the causal impact of store proximity on a
household’s spending over the month. While we do not argue that we are able to identify
the causal impact of car ownership, we provide evidence that household spending over
the month does not determine whether a household gains or loses a car and that future
car ownership does not correlate with contemporaneous shopping behavior.
We find that proximity to grocery stores allows households to smooth expenditure
over the benefit month. This impact is noticeable for households that do not own cars,
and is smaller for household that own cars. Since whether a household owns a car
influences the impact of proximity, we also measure directly the effect of car ownership.
We find that households which lose a car and live far from a grocery store are more likely
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to concentrate expenditures at the beginning of the month, and so transaction costs likely
constrain their ability to visit grocery stores. However, we also find that households
which gain a car have more pronounced monthly expenditure cycles, suggesting that
there is demand for larger shopping trips among at least some households. We also
find that households which lose a car and live close to a grocery store actually have
smoother expenditures over the month than before they lose a car, and that some of
this smoothing could be due to substitution towads convenience store expenditures later
in the month. Our results suggest that common policy solutions to the monthly SNAP
cycle may have unintended detrimental impacts on households that do not have access
to a car. If benefits are disbursed more often, these households will have to incur more
travel and time costs to make additional trips to grocery stores, and may substitute
expenditures away from grocery stores and towards convenience stores, which could have
additional implications for diet quality.
We will first discuss the data and how we use it to measure store proximity. Then
we turn to our empirical strategy for estimating the impact of store proximity as well as
car ownership. Next we should decriptive and analytical results, and conclude with a
summary and policy implications.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Dataset
To measure the effect of store access on SNAP expenditure smoothing, we use administra-
tive data provided by a state SNAP program. Our data cover 133,548,882 unique SNAP
transactions from 71,256 households in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area from
October 2007 – September 2010. For each transaction we observe the amount, the date,
and the store name and location. The transaction data also include the time and date
on which benefits were given to each household. We combine these transaction-level
data with monthly administrative data on each household, including information on
household demographics, amount of authorized SNAP benefits, car ownership, and the
household’s address. These data allow us to describe a household’s benefit month4 and
4See Appendix B.1 for details on how benefit months were defined and days since benefit issuance
was calculated.
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access to stores of a range of formats. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 displays summary statistics for
households at different distances to the nearest grocery store by car ownership.
We use two samples from these administrative data to measure the impact of store
proximity and car ownership. To measure the effect of store proximity, we include
households for which we can always identify the household address, who live in urban
census tracts, who never move addresses during the time they are observed,5 or who
received benefits more than once in a benefit month.6 In addition, to better control
for changing household preferences, we exclude households that have no car for part
of the time they are observed but do have a car for other months. This yields a total
household-benefit month sample size of 483,092. To measure the impact of car ownership,
we use a similarly-defined sample except that we include only households that experience
a change in car ownership status, giving a household-month sample size of 66,337. This
household-month sample includes 1,267 households that gain a car and 1,019 households
that lose a car.7
3.2.2 Store formats
Information on the store name and address allow us to categorize stores in the Minneapolis-
St. Paul metropolitan area into five different groups. In this paper we focus on grocery
stores, but our comprehensive store data make it possible to control for proximity to
other store formats. Given the possibile relationship between store format shopping
and diet quality, our store format definitions focus on the likely assortment of healthy
foods such as fresh fruits and vegetables. Grocery stores generally have the greatest
assortment of healthy foods, and are traditional grocery stores and supermarkets as well
as supercenters, mass merchandisers, and warehouse club stores. Convenience stores
have the smallest assortment of healthy foods (Caspi et al., 2016; Cannuscio et al., 2013)
and consist of corner stores, gas marts, dollar stores, and pharmacies. Limited assortment
stores include stores such as Aldi which stock a limited variety healthy foods. We classify
as Ethnic stores any store that we can identify from the name as catering to a specific
5Variation in proximity to stores can also come from households moving location. We restrict our
sample to households that do not move so that temporal variation in proximity is due solely to store
location changes.
6See Appendix B.1.
7Gaining a car is defined as transitioning from no car to having at least one car, and losing a car is
defined as transitioning from having at least one car to having no cars.
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ethnic customer base.8 Ethnic stores are smaller and often more conveniently-located
than grocery stores, but are also more likely than convenience stores to stock healthy
foods such as fresh vegetables. Finally, we categorize as Other stores all cooperatives,
natural food stores, farmers markets, butchers, and bakeries.
3.2.3 Store proximity
For each store format, we define geographic proximity as the concentration of stores
near a household. Greater store concentration means lower the travel time and greater
ease of accessing a particular store format. We measure store format concentration in
two ways. First, we measure the concentration of stores within a small area around a
household using a series of overlapping indicators for whether a household has a store
within 0.5 miles, 1 mile, and 1.5 miles of its address. These indicators follow the access
definitions similar to those used by the USDA Food Access Research Atlas data for
urban areas, and provide a similar strategy to the one used by Currie et al. (2010) to
measure the impact of fast food restaurants on obesity. Each indicator measures the
additional impact of being within a specific distance, relative to being in the next-largest
radius.
Previous research has shown, however, that households often do not shop at the closest
grocery store (Ver Ploeg et al., 2015). In this case, the food retail environment within 1.5
miles may not reflect the geographic access to stores as experienced by households. We
therefore use a second measure of geographic access that summarizes the concentration
of a wider range of store distances into one number. Following commonly-used definitions
for concentration indices,9 we define a distance-weighted index of the closest 20 stores of






where dhs is the Euclidean distance between household h and store s. Our baseline value
for θ is 1/2.10
8Ethnic stores in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area commonly identify as Hispanic, Asian,
or East African.
9The various methods for defining indices that summarize access are summarized in Bhat et al. (2000).
Kuang (2017) provides an example from the economics literature.
10We also check robustness to values of θ and other definitions of the kernel in Appendix B.2.
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3.2.4 Describing shopping over the month
Much of the research documenting monthly expenditure and consumption cycles reports
regress weekly expenditures (or log expenditures) on indicators for the number of weeks
since benefit issuance. The coefficients on the indicators are generally increasingly
negative, indicating increasingly lower expenditure/consumption over the course of the
month. We use two outcomes that provide similar information on the speed at which
household spend down their SNAP benefits, but also allow greater flexibility in terms of
the empirical strategy. First, we use the percent of total monthly SNAP expenditures
that is used in the first week of a specific benefit month.11 Second, we define an indicator
for whether all of the SNAP expenditures in a particular benefit month occured within
the first week of the benefit month (and so the value of the first outcome is 100). These
outcomes are similar in spirit to the approach used by Dobkin and Puller (2007), who
use the ratio of early-month to late-month hospital admissions to describe the monthly
cycle of admissions, and Dorfman et al. (2018), who use the ratio of expenditures in the
first four days of the month to describe the monthly SNAP expenditure cycle.
3.3 Empirical strategy
3.3.1 General empirical strategy
Our primary specification describes the relationship between our outcomes of interest
to store proximity, car ownership, and other household characteristics. Specifically, we




Ahtf + θZht + τt + εh + εht, (3.1)
where Ahtf is a household’s proximity to a particular store format, Zht are household-
month controls, τt denote month fixed effects, and εh are household fixed effects. Since to
our knowledge all previous work has reported cross-sectional relationships (i.e. without
11The denominator in this outcome is the total SNAP expenditures in a month. Alternately we could
use the total SNAP benefits issued to the household that month. We choose the former because benefits
can roll over from month to month, and in any given month a household could spend more or less than
their given benefit amount.
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household fixed effects), we report cross-sectional results as well as those with household
fixed effects. As explained above, we define access for household h in month t to store
format f Ahtf in one of two ways:
Ahtf = ηIhtf (3.2)
where Ihtf is the concentration index as defined in Section 3.2.3, or
Ahtf = αD05htf + βD10htf + γD15htf (3.3)
where D05 is an indicator for whether household has a store of format f within 0.5 miles
in month t, and D10 and D15 are similar indicators for 1 mile and 1.5 miles, respectively.
Note that the indicators are not mutually exclusive; the total impact of having a store
within 0.5 miles is α+ β + γ.
Our first outcome is the percent of expenditures that occur in the first week of the
benefit month. A positive coefficient on a variable implies an increase the percent of
expenditures in the first week and so lumpier expenditure patterns over time. The
second outcome is the indicator for whether a household uses SNAP benefits only in
the first week of the month. A positive coefficient implies a greater probability that the
households spends all of their SNAP expenditures early in the month, and so similarly
indicates a more pronounced SNAP cycle.
Zht are household-month controls: household size, household racial composition
(black, white, Hispanic, and other), household age composition (percent under 18,
percent 18-30, percent 31-45, percent 46-65, percent 66-81, percent over 81), whether
the household is headed by a single parent, income, whether the benefit month starts
on a Friday,12 the length of the benefit “month”, the extra benefits due only to SNAP
policy changes,13 and the cumulative number of consecutive benefit “months” that we
observe the household receiving SNAP benefits.14
12Castellari et al. (2016) find that spending patterns are different when households receive benefits on
weekends than on weekdays.
13This is defined to be the household’s authorized benefit level in a month less the amount of benefits
the household would have been authorized to receive before the October 2008 cost of living adjustment.
14The number of consecutive “months” is therefore specific to each spell that the household is on
SNAP. For households with one spell on SNAP, the number of consecutive months is just the total
number of months the household has been receiving SNAP up until that month. Households with more
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To answer whether proximity to stores influences how quickly households spend their
SNAP benefits over a month, we are interested in the relationships given by coefficients
η, α, β, and γ. Since we would expect that the degree to which households are influenced
geographic proximity to stores to differ by car ownership, we estimate Equation ??
separately for households with cars and households without cars. Furthermore, Todd
(2015) shows that the monthly consumption cycle is less pronounced after a large benefit
increase in 2009 due to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). We
therefore estimate separate models using pre-ARRA months.15
We use a similar specification with the sample of households that change car ownership




Ahtf + δI(car) + θZht + τt + εh + εht, (3.4)
where the only difference from above is the addition of I(car), an indicator for car
ownership. The primary coefficient of interest from this model is δ. We estimate
Equation 3.4 separately households that gain a car and households that lose a car.16
In order to make the coefficient interpretable as the impact of a car gain versus loss,
in car gain regressions I(car) is an indicator for the presence of a car, and in car loss
regressions I(car) is an indicator for the absence of a car. To investigate how grocery
store proximity changes the relationship between car ownership and the SNAP cycle, we
interact I(car) with either the household-month grocery store concentration index or
indicators for whether the household has a grocery store within X miles, where X is




Ahtf + δ1I(car) + δ2I(car)× I(X miles) + δ3I(X miles) + θZht + τt + εh + εht,
(3.5)
than one spell on SNAP during our period will have more than one “first” consecutive months. This
variable, then, captures breaks in SNAP benefit receipt.
15Restricting models to pre-ARRA months, however, also restricts the variation in store proximity to a
smaller number of store openings and closings. The pre-ARRA analysis is therefore possibly lower-power
test of the impact of proximity than including all months.
16We exclude households that both gained and lost a car.
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3.3.2 Causal identification
For identification of the impact of store proximity on benefit usage over the month, we
require that stores do not locate near households due to the speed at which they spend
benefits. We address these requirements using three strategies. First, household fixed
effects control for any time-invariant differences in unobservables such as preferences
that would influence store location decisions. When we report cross-sectional results
from models that do not include household fixed effects, we will speak of associative
relationships. Second, we control for past neighborhood-level shopping behavior.17 These
controls account for the attractiveness of any neighborhood to a store that is related to
the neighborhood’s (changing) shopping patterns.
The second method we use is conceptually similar to Currie et al.’s (2010) strategy for
identifying the impact of fast food restaurants on obesity and relies on observing small
variation in proximity between households. The series of 0.5-, 1-, and 1.5-mile indicators
allow us to compare households that are 0.5 miles away from a store to households that
are 1 mile away from a store. If store and household location within 1.5 miles of a
specific household is based on factors (conditionally) unrelated to store access, then a
comparison of households within that range gives a valid causal estimate of the impact
of store access. This strategy allows stores to locate to neighborhoods based on changing
neighborhood characteristics, but that the location within neighborhoods is constrained
to which sites are available for purchase at the time that the store is looking to buy.
Note that we exclude households which change car ownership status from the sample
measuring the impact of store proximity, so our comparison of the impacts of proximity
for car owners and households without cars is plausibly not influenced by selection of
household-months into the car owner or not-car owner sample.
In order to measure the causal impact of car ownership on households that change car
ownership status, we would require that households obtain and lose cars at random over
time.18 As shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, this is not likely the case - average household
17We use census tracts to define neighborhoods. To avoid neighborhood averages mechanically reflecting
an individual household’s behavior, a household’s tract-level average variables are defined to exclude
that household. Tract-level shopping variables that we include are 1- and 3-month lagged tract average
percent of spending within the first 2 weeks, and the 1- and 3-month average tract lagged share of
expenditures at each store format.
18Conditional of household fixed effects.
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size suddenly changes at the same time as a household changes car ownership status,
and income displays trends both before and after car gain/loss. We do observe, however,
that households that lose a car and live within 0.5 miles of a grocery store display on
average far smaller trends in household size and income at the same time as losing the
car, suggesting that this sample could provide more valid information on the effect of
car ownership apart from other factors.
3.4 Results: Store proximity
3.4.1 Descriptive
Differences in spending over the month
We first document differences in the pace at which households draw down benefits over
proximity to grocery stores. Figure 3.1 shows the average spending, for households that
differ by distance to the nearest grocery store and car ownership, for each day of the
benefit month as a proportion of total SNAP expenditures. Each population experiences
a sharp drop in expenditures after the first day of the benefit month. For both households
within 0.5 miles and greater than 1.5 miles from a grocery store, those without cars
display somewhat lumpier expenditure than those with cars. Households without cars
noticeably spend approximately 5 percent more on the first day than households with
car. Comparing across Figure 3.1a and 3.1b, however, there is little difference between
households that live within 0.5 and further than 1.5 miles from the nearest grocery store.
Table 3.3 displays summaries of household spending over the benefit month, over
distance to the nearest grocery store and car ownership. Similar to Figure 3.1, we see
that there are very small differences between households at different distances to the
nearest grocery store. On average, however, households without cars display evidence of
less expenditure smoothing: Higher average percent of expenditures early in the benefit
month, and lower expenditures at the end of the month.
Opening a grocery store
We next document the average share of total expenditures that is spent in the first
two weeks of the month when a grocery store opens nearby. Figure 3.2 shows the
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distribution of the percent of expenditures in the first week of the month before and
after a grocery store opens near a household. After the grocery store opens, there is a
modest decrease in the proportion of households that spend all of their benefits in the
first month, and an increase in households that spend between 20 and 70 percent in the
first week. These distributional changes suggest that a grocery store opening may induce
a small improvement in expenditure smoothing over the month (or at least beyond the
first week).
3.4.2 Empirical model
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 display the grocery store proximity coefficients from our primary
empirical specification for our outcomes. As mentioned above, we estimate separate
models for households with and without cars and for pre-ARRA months. Models 1-2
and 5-6 are cross-sectional and exclude household fixed effects, while Models 3-4 and
7-8 include household fixed effects. At the bottom of each table, we include the implied
cumulative impact of having a store within 0.5 miles of the household.
In Table 3.4 we see little impact of grocery store access on the average percent of
expenditures in the first week. The cross-sectional results show a consistently negative
relationship between proximity and early-month expenditures, suggesting that proximity
could contribute to proportionately less spent early in the month and therefore greater
expenditure smoothing. The results using household fixed effects, however, display
considerable uncertainty and no consistent relationship.
Table 3.5 presents the results from the model using as the dependent variable an
indicator for whether all expenditures occured in the first week. The coefficients then show
the impact of grocery store proximity on the probability of having spent everything in
the first week. While the concentration index coefficients are only statistically significant
in models without fixed effects, they consistently show a negative relationship between
proximity and spending everything. When we compare households within 1.5 miles of
a grocery store opening, however, we do observe an impact of proximity. Households
within 0.5 miles of an opening have substantial and statistically significant decreases
in the probability of spending everything compared with even households just within 1
mile. Notably, the impact of proximity is concentrated in households within 0.5 miles of
a grocery store opening who do not own a car. Prior to the ARRA, being within 0.5
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miles of a grocery store opening resulted in a 6 percent lower probability of spending
everything in the first week.
3.4.3 Placebos
To test our identifying assumptions, we run three types of placebo analyses. First, we
regress grocery store proximity along with all of our controls (including household fixed
effects) on household observables to test whether store location decisions are influenced
by observables even after controlling for everything. Primary observables that change
over time in our data are income and household size. Table 3.6 shows the results from
this exercise. We find that proximity to grocery stores does not significantly predict
household income or size, suggesting that store locations are not being determined by
anything more than we include in our models.
Our second placebo tests whether our outcomes predict store location relative to
households. If our identifying assumption is correct, outcomes should not predict store
location, conditional on all of our controls. This test is shown in columns 1-3 of Tables
3.7 and 3.8. The coefficients on our outcomes are tiny and statistically insignificant.
The final test regresses current and future store proximity measures on our outcomes,
again including all of our usual controls. This test is displayed in columns 4-5 of Tables
3.7 and 3.8. Proximity of grocery stores three months later does not predict our outcomes
with statistical significance at conventional levels, and the effects of future proximity are
generally smaller or wrong-signed. We take these placebo tests as support for identifying
assumption that store location decisions are exogenous to our model after including our
control variables.
3.5 Results: Car ownership and expenditure smoothing
3.5.1 Descriptive
The previous section showed that proximity to grocery stores allows greater expenditure
smoothing primarily for households without cars. A related question, then, is the extent
to which car ownership itself matters. In this section we show how car ownership is
related to expenditure smoothing for a sample of households that change car ownership
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status.
We first document changes in the percent of expenditures within the first week before
and after the gain/loss of a car. Figure 3.5 describes the percent of expenditures in
the first week before and after a household gains a car, and Figure 3.6 does the same
for a car loss. Panel (a) displays the average early-month expenditure percent for the
three months before and six months after the car gain/loss, and Panel (b) shows a
kernel density plot of the distribution of first-week expenditures before and after the
car gain/loss. We see substantial variation in the averages over time, but Figure 3.5a
suggests that households over 1.5 miles from a grocery store actually had less smooth
expenditures after buying a car - the percent of expenditures in the first week increases
significantly though for only a short time. On the other hand, Figure 3.6a does show
that losing a car may contribute to lumpier consumption - after losing a car, households
over 1.5 miles from a grocery store spend consistently more in the first week than they
did before. Turning to the distributional changes due to car ownership, Figure 3.5b
suggests that households which gain a car are less likely to spend everything in the first
week and more likely to spend between 20 and 80 percent of expenditures during that
time. The distributional impacts of losing a car are less clear.
3.5.2 Empirical model
We present the results of gaining a car in Tables 3.9 –3.11. First, Tables 3.9 shows the
coefficient δ from Equation 3.4. Table 3.9 shows very little impact of gaining a car on
early-month expenditures. The effects are measured with considerable noise and do not
tell a consistent story. Table 3.10 displays how the impact of car ownership varies over
distance to the grocery store for all months. Columns 1 and 4 interact car ownership
with the concentration index, columns 2 and 5 interact car ownership with an indicator
for whether there is a grocery store within 0.5 miles, and columns 3 and 6 interact car
ownership with whether there is a grocery store within 1.5 miles. Table 3.11 displays
the same models using only pre-ARRA months. The relationships using all months are
measured with considerable uncertainty and the effect sizes are generally much smaller
than the models focusing on the pre-ARRA time period. We can say with some degree
of confidence, however, that the null effect from Table 3.9 masks heterogeneity over
proximity to grocery stores. In pre-ARRA months (Table 3.11 column 6), for households
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which are greater than 1.5 miles away from a grocery store, gaining a car increases the
probability of spending everything in the first week. This effect disappears as households
get within 1.5 miles of a grocery store. We note that, while statistically insignificant,
this general pattern is evident in the different measures of proximity shown in columns 4
and 5. Thus we find evidence that gaining a car decreases expenditure smoothing for
households far from a grocery store.
Tables 3.12 - 3.14 show the corresponding models using the sample of households
that lost a car. Although in all months not having a car is associated with a greater
probability of spending everything in the first week,19, in the fixed effects specification
losing a car is associated with a smaller probability of spending everything early in the
month. Thus losing a car is associated with more expenditure smooothing. When we
examine how this relationship differs over grocery store proximity, we see in Table 3.1420
that households which live far from a grocery store and lose a car generally have greater
probability of spending everything in the first week. Column 6 shows that households
greater than 1.5 miles from a grocery store which lose a car increase the probability of
spending everything early in the month.21 Households which live within 1.5 miles of a
grocery store and lose a car, however, are 5 percent less likely22 to spend everything
in the first week. Thus we find heterogeneity in the overall result from Table 3.12:
Households which lose a car and live far from a grocery store tend to have less smooth
expenditure, while households which lose a car and live close to a grocery store actually
have more smooth consumption.
3.5.3 Car ownership and transaction costs
We have so far shown that gaining a car is associated with lumpier expenditure patterns
for households far from a grocery store, and losing a car is similarly associated with
lumpier expenditure patterns for households far from a grocery store. Households
19Table 3.12 column 1.
20We will emphasize the pre-ARRA results since they display the same general relationship but have
larger effect sizes. The pre-ARRA results are likely most relevant to time periods without the ARRA
level of benefits - the benefit increase ended in 2013. However, we report the results for all months in
Table 3.13 for completeness.




which lose a car and are close to a grocery store have less lumpy expenditures. More
concentrated expenditure at the beginning of the month for households which lose a car
and live far from a grocery store is consistent with a story in which transaction costs
constrain the ability of these households to visit the store more often throughout the
month. However, the other two main results are not consistent with a transaction costs
story. If transaction costs were the dominant reason for an expenditure cycle, we would
expect that gaining a car would allow less lumpy expenditure patterns for all households,
and that losing a car would similarly force lumpier expenditures even at close distances
to the grocery store.23
Our results suggest the following two explanations. First, households choose to
acquire a car (partially) in order to make larger trips to the grocery store. Thus
households demand even lumpier consumption than they are able to accomplish without
a car. Second, we note that the alternative to lumpier expenditures at a grocery store
is not necessarily smoother grocery store expenditures. Instead, one alternative is
smoother expenditures from convenience stores (or stores of other store formats). That
is, households which do not spend as much in grocery stores at the beginning of the
month may simply spend more at convenience stores later in the month. With this story,
we have to testable hypotheses:
1. Households which gain a car and live far from a grocery store have a more
pronounced cycle because they substitute away from convenience store expenditures
to grocery store expenditures at the beginning of the month.
2. Households which lose a car and live close to a grocery store have a less pronounced
cycle because they substitute convenience store expenditures throughout the month
for concentrated grocery store expenditures at the beginning of the month.
To test these hypotheses, we run Equation 3.5 using as an outcome the percent
of monthly expenditures at convenience stores. Tables 3.15 and 3.16 show the results
of this test. Households which gain a car and live far from a grocery store do not, in
fact, spend a smaller percent at convenience stores. In the hypothetical case where a
23We would expect that the impact of losing a car would be attenuated at close distances to a grocery
store compared to further distances, but we would not expect the relationship to switch sign, as it does
in our results.
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household is proximate to no grocery stores (the concentration index equals 0), gaining
a car is associated with a 6 percentage point increase in convenience store expenditures
(column 4 of Table 3.15). At the mean grocery store concentration index for households
with a grocery store over 1.5 miles away (10.33), the impact of gaining a car is no
change in the percent of expenditures at convenience stores. Turning to households
which lose a car and live close to a grocery store, Table 3.16 shows that households
close to a grocery store do increase convenience store expenditures when they lose a car.
Column 6 implies that the percent of expenditures at convenience stores increases by 1
percentage point24 We therefore find some support for our conjecture that consumption
smoothing by households which lose a car is due to substitution towards convenience
store expenditures, but we do not find evidence that this is the case for households which
gain a car.
3.6 Discussion and conclusion
Lumpy monthly spending patterns of poor households have presented researchers with an
empirical puzzle. One particular manifestation of this is with food assistance programs:
SNAP households experience significant declines in SNAP expenditure over the month
until they receive their next benefit payment. Previous research suggests that this
decline creates cycles in total food consumption, is related to decreasing diet quality
over the month, and may entail adverse health effects. The reasons for this monthly
expenditure decline are not well understood, with much previous work attributing it to
irrational time-inconsistent preferences. We test an alternative explanation: Whether the
decline could be due to transaction costs associated with grocery shopping. Using unique
administrative SNAP data from a large metropolitan area and a robust identification
strategy, we show that proximity to grocery stores does allow households to smooth
expenditure more over the month. This effect is most noticeable in households without
cars. Given the heterogeneous impacts of proximity over car ownership, we also show
assocations between car ownership and SNAP expenditure smoothing. Contrary to
our transactions cost hypothesis, we find that gaining a car is associated with more
concentrated expenditures at the beginning of the month. We also find that losing a car
242.7− 1.7, though the value 1.7 is not statistically different from zero.
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is associated with smoother expenditure for some households, and show that part of this
smoothing could be due to substitution towards convenience store expenditures later in
the month.
We note that our analysis has a few limitations. Our data come from the period
of the recent recession in the Twin Cities metropolitan area, which could potentially
restrict its external validity to other times and locations. We also do not see non-SNAP
expenditures, which could be used more (or less) smoothly over the SNAP benefit month.
Finally, what we gain with our data in comprehensiveness as to the population of interest
- SNAP participants - we give up in the ability to observe each household in more depth.
We therefore cannot tell, for example, why a household chose to obtain a car, which
could add to the causal implications of car ownership.
Our results suggest that access to stores - both proximity to stores as well as access
to a car - contributes to the SNAP cycle. Furthermore, we show the importance
of considering proximity and car access together. Proximity plays a smaller role for
households that own cars, but is a potentially significant cause of lumpier expenditures
over the month for households that do not own cars. This finding implies that the
common policy suggestion of paying benefits to households more than once per month
could negatively impact those who do not have easy access to a car by imposing additional
time and travel costs to make another trip to the grocery store. If the car-less household
cannot add more grocery store trips into their monthly schedule, spending at convenience
stores may increase. This shift towards convenience store spending could have further
implications for diet quality and health. Expenditure smoothing in households with
access to cars, however, is not noticeably impacted by store proximity. Policies such as
more frequent disbursements to enforce smoother spending may help these households
while causing fewer negative unintended consequences.
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3.7 Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: Nonparametric regressions of expenditure over benefit month
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of the percent of expenditures spent in first week, before and
after grocery store opening
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Notes: The figure shows kernel density graphs of the distribution of the percent of expenditures
in the first week of the benefit month for the 3 months before (“Before”) and the 3 months after
(“After”) a grocery store opening.
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Figure 3.3: Description of household characteristics before and after gaining a car
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Notes: The figures show the average monthly household size and income of households whose
car ownership status changed from having no car to having at least one car (“car purchase”) for
6 months before to 6 months after the addition of the car.
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Figure 3.4: Description of household characteristics before and after losing a car
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Notes: The figures show the average monthly household size and income of households whose
car ownership status changed from having at least one car to having no car for 6 months before
to 6 months after the loss of the car.
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Figure 3.5: Description of outcomes before and after gain of a car
(a) Average percent of expenditures in the first
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Notes : The figures show the average and distribution of the percent of expenditures spent in the
first week, for households whose car ownership status changed from having no car to having at
least one car for 6 months before to 6 months after the addition of the car.
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Figure 3.6: Description of outcomes before and after loss of a car
(a) Average percent of expenditures in the first
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Notes : The figures show the average and the distribution of the percent of expenditures spent in
the first week, for households whose car ownership status changed from having at least one car
to having no car for 6 months before to 6 months after the addition of the car.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics of control variables by distance to nearest grocery store
(in miles): Households with cars
>1.5 1 - 1.5 0.5 - 1 <0.5
Household size 2.80 2.84 2.77 2.75
White 0.66 0.53 0.55 0.58
Black 0.14 0.23 0.19 0.20
Hispanic 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
Other race 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.20
% under 18 33.10 33.59 31.37 32.83
% 18-30 13.36 13.65 13.26 13.66
% 31-45 19.44 19.21 19.03 18.62
% 46-65 28.25 27.84 30.52 27.52
%66-80 5.46 5.07 5.10 6.14
% 81+ 0.38 0.59 0.71 1.21
Whether single parent 0.28 0.30 0.27 0.30
Income 519.66 535.01 521.26 539.86
Length of benefit month 29.98 30.01 30.00 30.01
Consecutive months 8.29 8.92 9.01 9.06
Grocery store index 9.89 11.22 11.71 12.51
Convenience store index 12.68 16.15 16.81 15.94
Discount store index 6.10 6.84 6.80 6.60
Ethnic store index 9.15 12.87 13.15 12.28
Other store index 9.01 10.76 11.15 10.75
Tract mean income 400.34 383.36 376.65 388.95
Tract % SNAP 2.23 3.66 3.57 3.18
N 29008 58915 83319 48642
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics of control variables by distance to nearest grocery store
(in miles): Households without cars
>1.5 1 - 1.5 0.5 - 1 <0.5
Household size 1.56 1.56 1.55 1.51
White 0.47 0.36 0.38 0.44
Black 0.29 0.41 0.36 0.36
Hispanic 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06
Other race 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.14
% under 18 17.19 16.80 17.68 16.67
% 18-30 17.64 20.40 20.08 18.46
% 31-45 17.69 17.80 18.26 17.55
% 46-65 34.97 34.71 35.15 34.64
%66-80 9.47 8.37 6.82 9.48
% 81+ 3.04 1.89 1.98 3.18
Whether single parent 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.14
Income 290.25 288.56 271.05 297.95
Length of benefit month 30.20 30.19 30.19 30.19
Consecutive months 9.56 9.79 9.84 10.12
Grocery store index 10.45 11.74 12.31 13.47
Convenience store index 15.31 19.33 19.84 19.27
Discount store index 6.58 7.33 7.30 7.21
Ethnic store index 11.04 16.20 16.46 15.92
Other store index 9.97 12.13 12.72 12.59
Tract mean income 371.54 359.07 338.85 345.83
Tract % SNAP 3.45 5.16 4.56 4.27
N 36311 105826 154453 93537
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics of spending over the month by distance to nearest grocery
store (in miles)
>1.5 1 - 1.5 0.5 - 1 <0.5
Car owners
% expenditures in first day 16.07 17.36 17.29 17.41
% expenditures in first week 53.65 55.57 55.72 55.72
% expenditures in last week 9.41 8.81 8.66 8.78
N 29008 58915 83319 48642
Households without cars
% expenditures in first day 20.28 21.38 21.43 20.84
% expenditures in first week 62.39 64.15 63.47 62.77
% expenditures in last week 6.56 6.31 6.71 6.67
N 36311 105826 154453 93537
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Table 3.4: Impact of grocery store access on the proportion of SNAP expenditures used
in the first week of the benefit month
All months Pre-ARRA
Car No car Car No car Car No car Car No car
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Grocery store index
Grocery -0.3** -0.1 -0.4 0.7 -0.3 -0.05 -0.4 0.6
(0.1) (0.1) (0.5) (0.4) (0.2) (0.2) (1.0) (0.8)
B. Grocery store indicators
I(0.5 miles) -0.04 -0.5 1.8 1.0 -0.09 -0.9* 0.7 0.6
(0.5) (0.4) (1.8) (1.4) (0.7) (0.5) (2.6) (1.9)
I(1 mile) 0.3 0.2 -0.008 -0.2 0.6 0.5 -0.5 1.5
(0.4) (0.4) (1.3) (1.2) (0.6) (0.5) (2.0) (1.6)
I(1.5 miles) 0.2 -0.5 -3.3** 0.3 0.2 -0.4 -3.2 -2.1
(0.6) (0.6) (1.6) (1.1) (0.8) (0.7) (2.5) (1.5)
Cumulative effect within 0.5 miles
Effect 0.415 -0.757 -1.507 1.120 0.749 -0.763 -3.010 0.030
F-stat 0.4 1.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.8 0.0003
N 219884 390127 219884 390127 69782 134863 69782 134863
Household fixed effects X X X X
Notes: Each column of Panel A and each column of Panel B is a different regression of access and controls
on the percent of the household’s total SNAP expenditures that occur within the first two weeks of the
household’s benefit month. The sample in columns (5)-(8) is restricted to months prior to the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in April 2009. I(0.5), I(1), and I(1.5) are indicators for the
presence of a grocery store within 0.5, 1, and 1.5 miles, respectively. The cumulative effect at 0.5 miles is
the percent increase on the outcome of having a store within 0.5 miles relative to 1.5 or more miles. The
F-statistic is the test statistic for the test that the cumulative effect at 0.5 miles equals zero. Standard
errors for all regressions are clustered at the household level. In addition to the corresponding access
measures to all other four store formats, regressions control for month-year fixed effects, household size,
household racial composition (black, Hispanic, and other), household age composition (percent under
18, percent 18-30, percent 31-45, percent 46-65, percent 66-81, percent over 81), whether the household
is headed by a single parent, income, amount of benefits, whether the benefit issuance occured on a
Friday, the extra benefits due only to SNAP policy changes, the length of the benefit month, number of
consecutive months on SNAP, one- and three-month lagged tract average store format shares and tract
average share of expenditures spent in first two weeks of the month, mean tract income, and tract %
SNAP participants. ∗∗∗p < 0.01∗∗p < 0.05∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.5: Impact of grocery store access on whether the 100% of expenditures occur in
first week of the benefit month
All months Pre-ARRA
Car No car Car No car Car No car Car No car
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Grocery store index
Grocery -0.004*** -0.002* -0.002 -0.001 -0.007*** -0.003 -0.01 -0.02
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.01) (0.01)
B. Grocery store indicators
I(0.5 miles) -0.004 -0.01*** -0.007 -0.01 -0.006 -0.02*** -0.06* -0.06**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.02) (0.02) (0.007) (0.006) (0.03) (0.03)
I(1 mile) -0.00006 -0.0005 0.02 -0.008 0.002 0.0004 0.01 0.02
(0.005) (0.004) (0.02) (0.01) (0.007) (0.006) (0.03) (0.02)
I(1.5 miles) 0.00002 -0.009 -0.01 -0.01 -0.002 -0.004 0.004 -0.03
(0.006) (0.007) (0.02) (0.01) (0.009) (0.009) (0.03) (0.02)
Cumulative effect within 0.5 miles
Effect -0.004 -0.022*** 0.001 -0.030* -0.006 -0.020** -0.043 -0.059**
F-stat 0.4 10.3 0.0009 2.8 0.4 4.8 2.6 6.6
N 219884 390127 219884 390127 69782 134863 69782 134863
Fixed effects X X X X
Notes: Each column of Panel A and each column of Panel B is a different regression of access and controls
on an indicator for whether all of the household’s SNAP expenditures occur within the first week of the
household’s benefit month. The sample in columns (5)-(8) is restricted to months prior to the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in April 2009. I(0.5), I(1), and I(1.5) are indicators for the
presence of a grocery store within 0.5, 1, and 1.5 miles, respectively. The cumulative effect at 0.5 miles is
the percent increase on the outcome of having a store within 0.5 miles relative to 1.5 or more miles. The F-
statistic is the test statistic for the test that the cumulative effect at 0.5 miles equals zero. Standard errors
for all regressions are clustered at the household level. In addition to the corresponding access measures
to all other four store formats, regressions control for month-year fixed effects, household size, household
racial composition (black, Hispanic, and other), household age composition (percent under 18, percent
18-30, percent 31-45, percent 46-65, percent 66-81, percent over 81), whether the household is headed
by a single parent, income, amount of benefits, whether the benefit issuance occured on a Friday, the
extra benefits due only to SNAP policy changes, the length of the benefit month, number of consecutive
months on SNAP, one- and three-month lagged tract average store format shares and tract average share
of expenditures spent in first two weeks of the month, mean tract income, and tract % SNAP participants.
∗∗∗p < 0.01∗∗p < 0.05∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.6: Relationship between store location and household demographics
Dependent variables
Income ($10) Household size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Grocery store index 3.3 -0.0008
(3.9) (0.006)
I(0.5 miles) -1.0 -0.01
(11.1) (0.02)
I(1 mile) -0.8 0.03
(11.3) (0.02)
I(1.5 miles) -8.0 -0.02
(10.1) (0.02)
N 610011 610011 610011 610011
N 610011 610011 610011 610011
Notes: Each column is a different regression on the depen-
dent variable specified. Models 1-2 regress income on grocery
store proximity and controls, and Models 3-4 regress house-
hold size on grocery store proximity and controls. I(0.5), I(1),
and I(1.5) are indicators for the presence of a grocery store
within 0.5, 1, and 1.5 miles, respectively. Standard errors for
all regressions are clustered at the household level. In addition
to the corresponding access measures to all other four store
formats, regressions control for month-year fixed effects, house-
hold size, household racial composition (black, Hispanic, and
other), household age composition (percent under 18, percent
18-30, percent 31-45, percent 46-65, percent 66-81, percent over
81), whether the household is headed by a single parent, income,
amount of benefits, whether the benefit issuance occured on a
Friday, the extra benefits due only to SNAP policy changes,
the length of the benefit month, number of consecutive months
on SNAP, one- and three-month lagged tract average store for-
mat shares and tract average share of expenditures spent in
first two weeks of the month, mean tract income, and tract %
SNAP participants. ∗∗∗p < 0.01∗∗p < 0.05∗p < 0.1
73




Index I(0.5 miles) I(1 mile) % in first week
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% in first week 0.000005 0.000003 -0.0000002
(0.00001) (0.000003) (0.000003)
Grocery store index 0.6
(0.4)
Grocery index 3 months later -0.5
(0.4)
I(0.5 miles) 0.5*** 1.9
(0.03) (1.3)
I(1 mile) 0.3*** -1.2
(0.02) (1.0)
I(1.5 miles) 0.07*** 0.4*** -0.6
(0.02) (0.02) (1.1)
I(0.5 miles) 3 months later -0.5
(1.4)
I(1 mile) 3 months later 1.7
(1.1)
I(1.5 miles) 3 months later -1.2
(1.3)
N 610011 610011 610011 496890 496890
Notes: Each column is a different regression on the dependent variable specified. Models 1-3
regress grocery store proximity on shopping behavior and controls, and Models 4-5 regress shopping
behavior on contemporaneous and future store proximity. I(0.5), I(1), and I(1.5) are indicators
for the presence of a grocery store within 0.5, 1, and 1.5 miles, respectively. Standard errors
for all regressions are clustered at the household level. In addition to the corresponding access
measures to all other four store formats, regressions control for month-year fixed effects, household
size, household racial composition (black, Hispanic, and other), household age composition (percent
under 18, percent 18-30, percent 31-45, percent 46-65, percent 66-81, percent over 81), whether the
household is headed by a single parent, income, amount of benefits, whether the benefit issuance
occured on a Friday, the extra benefits due only to SNAP policy changes, the length of the benefit
month, number of consecutive months on SNAP, one- and three-month lagged tract average store
format shares and tract average share of expenditures spent in first two weeks of the month, mean
tract income, and tract % SNAP participants. ∗∗∗p < 0.01∗∗p < 0.05∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.8: Impact of grocery store access on whether 100% of expenditures were spent
in first week: Placeobs
Dependent variables
Grocery store access
Index I(0.5 miles) I(1 mile) % in first week
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% in first week 0.000005 0.000003 -0.0000002
(0.00001) (0.000003) (0.000003)
Grocery store index 0.6
(0.4)
Grocery index 3 months later -0.5
(0.4)
I(0.5 miles) 0.5*** 1.9
(0.03) (1.3)
I(1 mile) 0.3*** -1.2
(0.02) (1.0)
I(1.5 miles) 0.07*** 0.4*** -0.6
(0.02) (0.02) (1.1)
I(0.5 miles) 3 months later -0.5
(1.4)
I(1 mile) 3 months later 1.7
(1.1)
I(1.5 miles) 3 months later -1.2
(1.3)
N 610011 610011 610011 496890 496890
Notes: Each column is a different regression on the dependent variable specified. Models 1-3
regress grocery store proximity on shopping behavior and controls, and Models 4-5 regress shopping
behavior on contemporaneous and future store proximity. I(0.5), I(1), and I(1.5) are indicators
for the presence of a grocery store within 0.5, 1, and 1.5 miles, respectively. Standard errors
for all regressions are clustered at the household level. In addition to the corresponding access
measures to all other four store formats, regressions control for month-year fixed effects, household
size, household racial composition (black, Hispanic, and other), household age composition (percent
under 18, percent 18-30, percent 31-45, percent 46-65, percent 66-81, percent over 81), whether the
household is headed by a single parent, income, amount of benefits, whether the benefit issuance
occured on a Friday, the extra benefits due only to SNAP policy changes, the length of the benefit
month, number of consecutive months on SNAP, one- and three-month lagged tract average store
format shares and tract average share of expenditures spent in first two weeks of the month, mean
tract income, and tract % SNAP participants. ∗∗∗p < 0.01∗∗p < 0.05∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.9: Impact of car gain: Overall
All months Pre-ARRA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. % spent in first week
Whether car 0.2 0.2 -2.7 -0.3
(1.1) (0.7) (1.8) (1.5)
N 18245 18245 5901 5901
B. Whether 100% spent in first week
Whether car -0.006 -0.01 -0.005 0.006
(0.01) (0.009) (0.02) (0.02)
N 18245 18245 5901 5901
Household fixed effects X X
Notes: Each column is a different regression of an indicator
for whether a household owns a car and controls on the out-
come specified in italics. The outcome for Panel A is the per-
cent of expenditures spent in the first two weeks of the benefit
month, and for Panel B is an indicator for whether 100% of
expenditures occured in the first week. Models 2,4,6, and 8
interact car ownership with the grocery store concentration in-
dex. Standard errors for all regressions are clustered at the
household level. In addition to access measures to all other
four store formats, regressions control for month-year fixed ef-
fects, household size, household racial composition (black, His-
panic, and other), household age composition (percent under
18, percent 18-30, percent 31-45, percent 46-65, percent 66-81,
percent over 81), whether the household is headed by a sin-
gle parent, income, amount of benefits, whether the month’s
benefit issuance occured on a Friday, the extra benefits due
only to SNAP policy changes, the length of the benefit month,
the number of times in the benefit month the household was
issued benefits, number of consecutive months on SNAP, one-
and three-month lagged tract average store format shares and
tract average share of expenditures spent in first two weeks of
the month, mean tract income, and tract % SNAP participants.
∗∗∗p < 0.01∗∗p < 0.05∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.10: Impact of car gain: Over distance, all months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. % spent in first week
Whether car -0.5 -0.4 -1.2 -1.7 0.8 0.3
(6.0) (1.1) (2.4) (4.2) (0.8) (1.5)
Index × whether have car 0.06 0.2
(0.5) (0.4)
I(0.5) × whether have car -2.0 -1.6
(2.1) (1.4)
I(1.5) × whether have car 0.4 0.2
(2.5) (1.6)
N 18245 18245 18245 18245 18245 18245
B. Whether 100% spent in first week
Whether car 0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.003 -0.007 0.02
(0.07) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.010) (0.02)
Index × whether have car -0.006 -0.001
(0.006) (0.004)
I(0.5) × whether have car -0.01 0.002
(0.02) (0.02)
I(1.5) × whether have car -0.03 -0.03
(0.03) (0.02)
N 18245 18245 18245 18245 18245 18245
Household fixed effects X X X
Notes: Each column is a different regression of an indicator for whether a household
owns a car and controls on the outcome specified in italics. The outcome for Panel A
is the percent of expenditures spent in the first two weeks of the benefit month, and
for Panel B is an indicator for whether 100% of expenditures occured in the first week.
Models 2,4,6, and 8 interact car ownership with the grocery store concentration index.
Standard errors for all regressions are clustered at the household level. In addition
to access measures to all other four store formats, regressions control for month-year
fixed effects, household size, household racial composition (black, Hispanic, and other),
household age composition (percent under 18, percent 18-30, percent 31-45, percent 46-
65, percent 66-81, percent over 81), whether the household is headed by a single parent,
income, amount of benefits, whether the month’s benefit issuance occured on a Friday,
the extra benefits due only to SNAP policy changes, the length of the benefit month,
the number of times in the benefit month the household was issued benefits, number of
consecutive months on SNAP, one- and three-month lagged tract average store format
shares and tract average share of expenditures spent in first two weeks of the month,
mean tract income, and tract % SNAP participants. ∗∗∗p < 0.01∗∗p < 0.05∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.11: Impact of car gain: Over distance, Pre-ARRA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. % spent in first week
Whether car -10.1 -1.6 -0.06 -6.1 0.5 0.5
(10.3) (2.0) (4.4) (9.7) (1.6) (2.8)
Index × whether have car 0.6 0.5
(0.9) (0.8)
I(0.5) × whether have car -3.6 -3.6
(3.9) (3.2)
I(1.5) × whether have car -2.8 -0.9
(4.6) (3.1)
N 5901 5901 5901 5901 5901 5901
B. Whether 100% spent in first week
Whether car 0.02 -0.001 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.06**
(0.1) (0.03) (0.06) (0.1) (0.02) (0.03)
Index × whether have car -0.002 -0.001
(0.01) (0.01)
I(0.5) × whether have car -0.01 -0.06
(0.05) (0.05)
I(1.5) × whether have car -0.09 -0.07**
(0.06) (0.03)
N 5901 5901 5901 5901 5901 5901
Household fixed effects X X X
Notes: Each column is a different regression of an indicator for whether a household
owns a car and controls on the outcome specified in italics. The outcome for Panel A
is the percent of expenditures spent in the first two weeks of the benefit month, and
for Panel B is an indicator for whether 100% of expenditures occured in the first week.
Models 2,4,6, and 8 interact car ownership with the grocery store concentration index.
Standard errors for all regressions are clustered at the household level. In addition
to access measures to all other four store formats, regressions control for month-
year fixed effects, household size, household racial composition (black, Hispanic, and
other), household age composition (percent under 18, percent 18-30, percent 31-45,
percent 46-65, percent 66-81, percent over 81), whether the household is headed by
a single parent, income, amount of benefits, whether the month’s benefit issuance
occured on a Friday, the extra benefits due only to SNAP policy changes, the length
of the benefit month, the number of times in the benefit month the household was
issued benefits, number of consecutive months on SNAP, one- and three-month lagged
tract average store format shares and tract average share of expenditures spent in
first two weeks of the month, mean tract income, and tract % SNAP participants.
∗∗∗p < 0.01∗∗p < 0.05∗p < 0.1
78
Table 3.12: Impact of car loss: Overall
All months Pre-ARRA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. % spent in first week
No car 1.0 0.4 -0.2 -1.0
(1.3) (0.8) (2.0) (1.8)
N 15662 15662 5485 5485
B. Whether 100% spent in first week
No car 0.03* -0.0006 0.01 -0.04*
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
N 15662 15662 5485 5485
Household fixed effects X X
Notes: Each column is a different regression of an indicator
for whether a household owns a car and controls on the out-
come specified in italics. The outcome for Panel A is the per-
cent of expenditures spent in the first two weeks of the benefit
month, and for Panel B is an indicator for whether 100% of
expenditures occured in the first week. Models 2,4,6, and 8
interact car ownership with the grocery store concentration in-
dex. Standard errors for all regressions are clustered at the
household level. In addition to access measures to all other
four store formats, regressions control for month-year fixed ef-
fects, household size, household racial composition (black, His-
panic, and other), household age composition (percent under
18, percent 18-30, percent 31-45, percent 46-65, percent 66-81,
percent over 81), whether the household is headed by a sin-
gle parent, income, amount of benefits, whether the month’s
benefit issuance occured on a Friday, the extra benefits due
only to SNAP policy changes, the length of the benefit month,
the number of times in the benefit month the household was
issued benefits, number of consecutive months on SNAP, one-
and three-month lagged tract average store format shares and
tract average share of expenditures spent in first two weeks of
the month, mean tract income, and tract % SNAP participants.
∗∗∗p < 0.01∗∗p < 0.05∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.13: Impact of car loss: Over distance, all months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. % spent in first week
No car 0.9 0.6 5.2* 0.9 0.2 -0.3
(6.7) (1.3) (2.9) (5.1) (0.9) (2.1)
Index × whether no car 0.01 -0.05
(0.6) (0.4)
I(0.5) × whether no car 0.1 -0.3
(2.4) (1.6)
I(1.5) × whether no car -5.3* 0.5
(2.9) (2.2)
N 15662 15662 15662 15662 15662 15662
B. Whether 100% spent in first week
No car 0.003 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.004 0.01
(0.07) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02)
Index × whether no car 0.002 -0.003
(0.006) (0.005)
I(0.5) × whether no car -0.003 -0.03
(0.03) (0.02)
I(1.5) × whether no car -0.03 -0.02
(0.04) (0.03)
N 15662 15662 15662 15662 15662 15662
Household fixed effects X X X
Notes: Each column is a different regression of an indicator for whether a household
owns a car and controls on the outcome specified in italics. The outcome for Panel
A is the percent of expenditures spent in the first two weeks of the benefit month,
and for Panel B is an indicator for whether 100% of expenditures occured in the
first week. Models 2,4,6, and 8 interact car ownership with the grocery store con-
centration index. Standard errors for all regressions are clustered at the household
level. In addition to access measures to all other four store formats, regressions
control for month-year fixed effects, household size, household racial composition
(black, Hispanic, and other), household age composition (percent under 18, percent
18-30, percent 31-45, percent 46-65, percent 66-81, percent over 81), whether the
household is headed by a single parent, income, amount of benefits, whether the
month’s benefit issuance occured on a Friday, the extra benefits due only to SNAP
policy changes, the length of the benefit month, the number of times in the benefit
month the household was issued benefits, number of consecutive months on SNAP,
one- and three-month lagged tract average store format shares and tract average
share of expenditures spent in first two weeks of the month, mean tract income,
and tract % SNAP participants. ∗∗∗p < 0.01∗∗p < 0.05∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.14: Impact of car loss: Over distance, Pre-ARRA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. % spent in first week
No car -0.4 -0.7 9.1* 3.5 -1.4 -0.3
(12.8) (2.2) (5.1) (11.5) (2.0) (4.3)
Index × whether no car 0.02 -0.4
(1.1) (1.0)
I(0.5) × whether no car 2.8 1.9
(4.0) (3.2)
I(1.5) × whether no car -10.6** -0.8
(5.3) (4.5)
N 5485 5485 5485 5485 5485 5485
B. Whether 100% spent in first week
No car 0.06 -0.0006 0.1* 0.2* -0.04 0.04
(0.2) (0.03) (0.07) (0.1) (0.03) (0.05)
Index × whether no car -0.004 -0.02**
(0.01) (0.01)
I(0.5) × whether no car 0.04 0.01
(0.05) (0.05)
I(1.5) × whether no car -0.1* -0.09*
(0.07) (0.05)
N 5485 5485 5485 5485 5485 5485
Household fixed effects X X X
Notes: Each column is a different regression of an indicator for whether a household
owns a car and controls on the outcome specified in italics. The outcome for Panel A
is the percent of expenditures spent in the first two weeks of the benefit month, and
for Panel B is an indicator for whether 100% of expenditures occured in the first week.
Models 2,4,6, and 8 interact car ownership with the grocery store concentration index.
Standard errors for all regressions are clustered at the household level. In addition
to access measures to all other four store formats, regressions control for month-
year fixed effects, household size, household racial composition (black, Hispanic, and
other), household age composition (percent under 18, percent 18-30, percent 31-45,
percent 46-65, percent 66-81, percent over 81), whether the household is headed by
a single parent, income, amount of benefits, whether the month’s benefit issuance
occured on a Friday, the extra benefits due only to SNAP policy changes, the length
of the benefit month, the number of times in the benefit month the household was
issued benefits, number of consecutive months on SNAP, one- and three-month lagged
tract average store format shares and tract average share of expenditures spent in
first two weeks of the month, mean tract income, and tract % SNAP participants.
∗∗∗p < 0.01∗∗p < 0.05∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.15: Impact of car gain on monthly percent of expenditures at convenience stores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Whether car 12.7 0.2 3.2 6.4** -0.4 1.1
(7.8) (1.2) (3.5) (2.7) (0.8) (2.1)
Index × whether have car -1.1* -0.6**
(0.7) (0.3)
I(0.5) × whether have car -3.2* -0.8
(1.8) (1.0)
I(1.5) × whether have car -4.3 -1.9
(3.6) (2.2)
N 5901 5901 5901 5901 5901 5901
Household fixed effects X X X
Notes: Each column is a different regression of an indicator for whether a
household owns a car and controls on the percent of monthly expenditures
spent at convenience stores or ethnic stores. Models 1 and 4 interact car
ownership with the grocery store concentration index, models 2 and 5 with
an indicator for whether there is a grocery store within 0.5 miles, and 3
and 6 with an indicator for whether there is a grocery store within 1.5 miles.
Standard errors for all regressions are clustered at the household level. In ad-
dition to access measures to all other four store formats, regressions control
for month-year fixed effects, household size, household racial composition
(black, Hispanic, and other), household age composition (percent under 18,
percent 18-30, percent 31-45, percent 46-65, percent 66-81, percent over 81),
whether the household is headed by a single parent, income, amount of be-
nefits, whether the month’s benefit issuance occured on a Friday, the extra
benefits due only to SNAP policy changes, the length of the benefit month,
the number of times in the benefit month the household was issued benefits,
number of consecutive months on SNAP, one- and three-month lagged tract
average store format shares and tract average share of expenditures spent
in first two weeks of the month, mean tract income, and tract % SNAP
participants. ∗∗∗p < 0.01∗∗p < 0.05∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.16: Impact of car loss on monthly percent of expenditures at convenience stores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No car -10.0** 1.1 -0.07 0.6 1.3* 2.7*
(5.0) (0.8) (1.6) (2.4) (0.7) (1.5)
Index × whether no car 0.9** 0.07
(0.5) (0.2)
I(0.5) × whether no car 1.0 -0.6
(2.7) (1.1)
I(1.5) × whether no car 1.5 -1.7
(1.9) (1.6)
N 5485 5485 5485 5485 5485 5485
Household fixed effects X X X
Notes: Each column is a different regression of an indicator for whether a
household owns a car and controls on the percent of expenditures spent at
convenience or ethnic stores. Models 1 and 4 interact car ownership with
the grocery store concentration index, models 2 and 5 with an indicator
for whether there is a grocery store within 0.5 miles, and 3 and 6 with an
indicator for whether there is a grocery store within 1.5 miles. Standard
errors for all regressions are clustered at the household level. In addi-
tion to access measures to all other four store formats, regressions control
for month-year fixed effects, household size, household racial composition
(black, Hispanic, and other), household age composition (percent under 18,
percent 18-30, percent 31-45, percent 46-65, percent 66-81, percent over
81), whether the household is headed by a single parent, income, amount
of benefits, whether the month’s benefit issuance occured on a Friday, the
extra benefits due only to SNAP policy changes, the length of the benefit
month, the number of times in the benefit month the household was issued
benefits, number of consecutive months on SNAP, one- and three-month
lagged tract average store format shares and tract average share of expen-
ditures spent in first two weeks of the month, mean tract income, and tract
% SNAP participants. ∗∗∗p < 0.01∗∗p < 0.05∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.17: Impact of car ownership: Placebos
Outcome
%. first week 100% first week
(1) (2)
A. Dependent variable: Whether household owns car
Outcome -0.0001 -0.008
(0.00009) (0.007)
B. Dependent variables: Outcomes
Household has car 0.2 0.0004
(0.6) (0.008)
Has car, +1 month -0.7 -0.01
(0.7) (0.009)
Has car, +2 months -0.04 0.002
(0.7) (0.009)
Has car, +3 months 0.1 0.004
(0.6) (0.007)
N 46219 46219
Notes: Each column of Panel A and each column of Panel B is a different regression. The regressions in Panel
A use the outcome variables to predict whether a household owns a car; only the coefficient on the outcome
variable is shown. Panel B show the car ownership coefficients from a regression of current car ownership and
car ownership in the subsequent three months on the respective outcome. Standard errors for all regressions
are clustered at the household level. In addition to access measures to all other four store formats, regressions
control for month-year fixed effects, household size, household racial composition (black, Hispanic, and other),
household age composition (percent under 18, percent 18-30, percent 31-45, percent 46-65, percent 66-81, percent
over 81), whether the household is headed by a single parent, income, amount of benefits, whether the benefit
issuance occured on a Friday, the extra benefits due only to SNAP policy changes, the length of the benefit
month, number of consecutive months on SNAP, one- and three-month lagged tract average store format shares
and tract average share of expenditures spent in first two weeks of the month, mean tract income, and tract %
SNAP participants. ∗∗∗p < 0.01∗∗p < 0.05∗p < 0.1
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Chapter 4
Labor Market Outcomes and
Food Assistance for Able-Bodied
Adults in the U.S.
4.1 Introduction
A strong social safety net provides clear benefits for potential recipients, but a major
concern is that it may decrease incentives to work. This has generated much public
debate on the possibility of tying safety net participation with employment through
the use of work requirements. Previous research on work requirements have focused
on cash welfare requirements imposed as a result of the welfare reform efforts in the
mid-1990’s. This research has suggested that work requirements increase employment but
not necessarily income or other outcomes (Karoly, 2001). The Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) also imposes a work requirement on certain populations,
which creates significant monetary and other costs on states to administer (Czajka et
al., 2001). Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2012) find significant work disincentives due to
SNAP especially among low-income single mothers, suggesting a potential role for a
work requirement. The SNAP work requirement, however, is imposed on a very different
population: able-bodied adults without dependents. The effect of the SNAP work
requirement on this population is not currently known.
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We estimate the labor supply impact of SNAP availability for able-bodied adults
without dependents (ABAWDs), a population that is required to work to receive benefits
for more than 3 months out of 36. Each state is able to apply for waivers to the work
requirement for certain areas (which may vary from a few counties to the entire state),
if they have relatively high unemployment. Many areas received waivers over the years,
while almost all restirctions were lifted in 2009, as part of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA). We use this variation to examine the impact of relaxing
the work requirement on ABAWD employment and work intensity. One of the intended
effects of a social safety net is to allow displaced workers the space to retool; without
a work requirement, it is plausible that ABAWDs find other productive uses of time
that enable better employment in the future. We therefore also estimate the impact of
relaxing the work requirement on ABAWD educational time use - part-time enrollment
in formal schooling as well as vocational training.
We combine two primary data sets to measure the impact of SNAP work policy on
ABAWDs. The Current Population Survey (CPS) provides data on employment, hours
worked, educational enrollment, and location. To identify the waiver status of ABAWDs
in the CPS, we also collect a rich database of SNAP ABAWD policies between 2005
and 2009 from a number of different sources and match this dataset to the CPS. This
policy database allows us to identify each ABAWD’s waiver status, and also includes
several other facets of SNAP ABAWD policies that are expected to influence the impact
of the work requirement waivers. We take advantage of the fact that the CPS uses
the same dwelling multiple times in its sampling, and use within-person variation in
waiver status over time to estimate changes in labor supply and educational outcomes.
We also examine heterogeneity in within-individual impacts over time and over local
characteristics such as the minimum wage.
Our results show that waiver implementation decreases the probability of being
employed among low-income ABAWDs by 3-5 percent, with larger impacts among
poor ABAWDs most at risk to be eligible for SNAP, such as having less than a high
school education. We find similar decreases in the number of weekly hours worked
and the probability of working over 20 hours per week conditional on not working full-
time. Furthermore, we find that these impacts disappear by three months after waiver
implementation for individual ABAWDs, even conditional on still being in poverty.
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Finally, we observe that individuals in areas with high minimum wages exhibit no
evidence of waivers being a work disincentive, and employment may even increase due to
waivers in areas with high minimum wages. We find no impact on educational time use.
In addition to estimating contemporary effects of work requirements for the SNAP
program, our paper contributes to current knowledge on the labor supply impacts of
SNAP.1,2 Perhaps the best evidence on SNAP work disincentives comes from the quasi-
experimental results of Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2012), who estimate the labor supply
response during the original rollout of the Food Stamp Program throughout the 1960’s
and 1970’s. They find no impact on the population in general, but a significant decrease
in work effort among households headed by a single female.
We estimate the labor supply response to the SNAP work requirement, which adds to
Hoynes and Schanzenbach’s (2012) results in three ways. First, we look at response to a
current policy option (imposing or waiving a work requirement), rather than introducing
the Food Stamp program entirely. Second, since we look at a current policy option, we
use current SNAP program policy and contemporary economic conditions, which could
be significantly different from when the Food Stamp program was first rolled out. Third,
due to the nature of the SNAP work requirement we estimate labor supply response for a
very policy-relevant population. ABAWDs, in contrast to single mothers, have arguably
fewer reasons to decrease work effort even in the absence of a work requirement. General
welfare impacts of single mother work effort are less clear than those of ABAWDs:
greater single mother employment has been shown to lead to less breastfeeding and less
time reading to children (Herbst, 2017), lower child test scores and greater behavioral
problems (Herbst and Tekin, 2010), greater likelihood of childhood obesity (Herbst and
Tekin, 2012), and worse parent-child interactions (Herbst and Tekin, 2014).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, we review current knowledge on
ABAWDs and their SNAP participation. We then turn to a description of our individual
and policy datasets and sources. After that, we describe our estimation strategy and
discuss causal identification of the impact of the work requirements. We next present
our results, and end with a discussion of limitations and implications.
1The original name of SNAP was the Food Stamp Program. Since most of the literature refers to
this name, we will here use “SNAP” and the Food Stamp Program interchangably.
2See Moffitt (2002) for a review of the literature.
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4.2 Literature Review: ABAWDs and SNAP
Due to the unique circumstances of ABAWDs as well as the unique policies targeting
them, ABAWDs tend to have a different relationship to SNAP than the rest of the
caseload. Those who are eligible are less likely to participate in SNAP than other
households (Farrell and Gibbs, 2003; MacKernan and Ratcliffe, 2003). There are mixed
results regarding how responsive ABAWD participation is to economic factors: Gleason
et al. (1998) and Kornfeld (2002) find that economic conditions are influential in ABAWD
SNAP participation, while Currie and Grogger (2001) find that SNAP participation of
single-person households - a large proportion of which are ABAWDs - is less responsive
to economic conditions than other households.
The work requirement may change how ABAWDs interact with SNAP. Wilde et al.
(2000) and Ziliak, Gunderson, and Figlio (2003) use state-level caseload data and find
that the share of ABAWDs covered by a waiver is associated with a higher caseload,
though this result is not robust to different specifications (Wilde et al., 2000). In a
similar vein, Mulligan (2012) uses SNAP Quality Control data to estimate that ARRA
waivers increase total SNAP participation by 2.3 percent. Danielson and Klerman
(2006), however, used state-level caseload data and a broader index measure representing
the severity of ABAWD time-limit policies, and found no effect of ABAWD policies
on caseloads. Ribar et al. (2010) use administrative data from South Carolina to
analyze the length of time and frequency that adult-only households received SNAP
benefits. They find that households who were subject to ABAWD time limits received
benefits for a shorter amount of time. These results are mirrored by state caseload
data, which show significant ABAWD caseload increases soon after waivers take effect
(Minnesota Department of Human Services, 2010) and large caseload decreases when
work requirements are re-implemented (Rosenbaum, D., and B. Keith-Jennings, 2016).
No study that we are aware of directly measures the impact of work requirements on
employment or other outcomes in the ABAWD population.3
3Kramer-LeBlanc et al. (1997) use pre-PRWORA information on non-working ABAWDs to estimate




To measure the impact of work requirement waivers on ABAWD outcomes, we require a
dataset that will identify potential ABAWDs and provide sufficient geographic and time
detail to identify ABAWDs in waived areas/months. The CPS4 surveys housing units
throughout the US, and allows us to observe basic demographic, work, and educational
characteristics for monthly samples of individuals. Key to our estimation strategy, the
CPS follows housing units over time in a rotating panel. A household is interviewed for
four consecutive months in one year, and then in the same four consecutive months in the
next year before rotating out of the sample. Each monthly sample contains households
that have been respondents for anywhere from one to eight months, over a span of up
to 18 months. Since housing units are followed across time, individuals are generally
identifiable across survey months (Drew et al., 2014). Since families can move and be
replaced in the survey by new families in the same housing unit, we restrict our sample to
ABAWDs whose race and sex do not change, and whose age difference from first survey
to last survey is under two years. In addition to labor supply variables and part-time
schooling status for each month, we obtain vocational training enrollment information
from the October education supplement and SNAP participation from the December
food security supplement for each year.
We define an ABAWD as any person between the ages of 18 and 49 who has no one
under 18 and no one over 65 in the household, who is not out of the labor force due
to a disability, and who is a citizen and not in school full-time. We include the last
two criteria in the definition to exclude people who are generally ineligible for SNAP
(non-citizens), or who are not subject to the work requirement (full-time students).
We restrict the sample to households with no elderly to exclude households where the
ABAWD may be taking care of an older household member. Our definition is very
similar to that of others who have used non-administrative data to identify ABAWDs.5
To target the population of ABAWDs most likely to be eligible for SNAP, we further
restrict our analysis to ABAWDs who are under 150 percent of poverty for the entire
4We obtain CPS data from every month January 2005 to March 2010 through IPUMS-CPS (King et
al., 2010).
5See Appendix C.1 for a summary of how other studies using survey data have defined ABAWDs.
89
time they are observed.
The definition of an ABAWD that is feasible with CPS data may differ from the
SNAP definition of ABAWDs in two ways: The CPS household definition does not
necessarily correspond to the SNAP household unit, and an individual whom the state
SNAP program classifies as disabled may not necessarily be out of the labor force due
to a disability. To investigate the impact of these definitional differences on the size of
the ABAWD population, Figure 4.1 compares the percentage of SNAP recipients who
are ABAWDs in the CPS data with the percentage in the SNAP Quality Control (QC)
data over our period of interest.6 The proportions track quite closely throughout our
period, with ABAWDs making up generally between 3-6 percent of the total CPS SNAP
caseload.
In the CPS, the geographic location of households is given at a number of different
levels. For all observations, the state is identified. Within a state, large counties and
most metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) are identified. For many MSAs, the CPS also
identifies individuals as living either in a principal city of the MSA or a non-principal city
area (balance). Finally, some specific cities are identified in large MSAs with multiple
principal cities. Using all levels of identification, we classify as closely as possible
each individual in the CPS as living in a waived area or unwaived area in that month.
Comparing the CPS geographies with the geographies that each state uses to waive
areas, we create stable geographic definitions across time to which we can assign a waiver
status.7 Since we restrict our sample to individuals that did not move in or out of a
housing unit during the time that the individual is observed in the CPS, each individual’s
waiver status across time is therefore identified using the same geographic definition.8
The CPS allows us to examine both labor supply and educational outcomes. We
measure whether an individual is employed as an indicator that takes 1 if the individual
reported being at work last week or has a job but was not at work last week. To
measure work intensity, we use the total hours worked in all jobs over the past week.9
6We restrict the QC ABAWD sample to ABAWDs in households without any elderly. The CPS
ABAWD sample in this figure is not restricted to those under 150 percent of poverty.
7See Appendix C.2 for more information on the area definitions.
8We are unable to identify the waiver status of individuals living in areas for which we have missing
waiver data, and for individuals living in areas with very heterogeneous waiver status. We are missing
waiver information for Georgia in 2008, Louisiana in 2006, Maine in 2008, and West Virginia in 2006. Of
our total CPS sample, 88 percent is assigned to an area definition and therefore a waiver status.
9We do not include in our analyses the 2 percent of individuals for whom the CPS hours worked data
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Since working 20 hours or more per week is considered “employed” according to work
requirement policy,10 we might suspect that ABAWDs subject to the work requirement
would work just over 20 hours. If they would prefer to work under 20 hours, relaxing the
work requirement would allow ABAWDs to decrease their work intensity to below the
20 hour per week requirement. Our final labor supply outcome is then an indicator for
whether an individual worked under 20 hours in the past week, conditional on working
between 0 and 39 hours in each month they are in our sample.
Our two educational outcomes are whether an individual is enrolled in high school
or university part-time, and whether the individual is enrolled in a vocational training
program. Individuals enrolled in school at least half time are not required to meet
the work requirement, but ABAWDs enrolled under half time are subject to the work
requirement. A waiver might allow ABAWDs more freedom to enroll in school part-time
or take part in a vocational training program. On the other hand, a waiver might
induce ABAWDs to participate less in SNAP E&T programs, decreasing participation
in classes or training programs. The basic monthly CPS asks whether an individual is
enrolled in school full-time or part-time. While this is an imperfect measure of half-time
enrollment, we estimate the impact of a waiver on part-time enrollment in a high school
or college/university. Each October the CPS fields the Education Supplement, which
includes a question on whether the individual is enrolled in a vocational training program.
This allows us to measure - with a smaller sample size since it comes only from the
October supplement - the impact of waivers on vocational training enrollment. We
expect that this is mostly likely to pick up any decrease in SNAP E&T activity due to
waiver implementation.11
It should be noted that we estimate reduced form waiver impacts without estimating
the “first stage” impact on ABAWD SNAP participation. We choose not to estimate
the first stage because the CPS entails notoriously under-reported SNAP participation
(Meyer and Mittag, 2015). This under-reporting may be greater or less among ABAWDs,
and it is difficult to assess any results on SNAP participation without understanding
more about ABAWD SNAP under-reporting. On the other hand, the CPS is the premier
are imputed.
10See Section 4.3.2.
11Note that this decrease may be due either to lack of incentives on the part of the ABAWD or to
states discontinuing SNAP E&T programs in the waived areas.
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U.S. labor force survey, and we expect any labor force results to have minimal problems
with misreporting.
4.3.2 ABAWD policy
The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)
restricted ABAWDs to three months of SNAP benefits in a 36-month period unless
they are employed 20 or more hours per week (80 monthly hours total), participating
in qualifying SNAP Employment and Training (E&T) components, or participating in
workfare.12 States have significant leeway in deciding how extensive the state SNAP
E&T program is, whether participation is mandatory for ABAWDs, and how many
workfare positions to offer. A state can further choose to pledge to provide an E&T or
workfare position for all ABAWDs at risk of losing SNAP eligibility. States which make
this pledge (“pledge states”) share $20 million in federal funds to fund the necessary
E&T program costs.13
There are two policies by which an ABAWD may be exempted or waived from
the work requirement. First, states can request a waiver from the Food and Nutrition
Service (FNS) for jurisdictions with an insufficient number of jobs. Up until 2009, states
initiated waiver requests for sub-state areas with high unemployment; these areas could
be individual cities, counties, multi-county regions, or even the entire state. The FNS
could - and sometimes did - deny all or parts of waiver requests. In April, 2009, the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) waived restrictions for the entire
country due to high levels of unemployment. Only a few areas (all in pledge states)
opted to continue enforcing the work requirement.
The second policy allows states to exempt from the work requirement - without FNS
approval - up to 15 percent of the ABAWDs who would otherwise be subject to the work
requirement. States have complete flexibility in deciding how to use their 15 percent
exemptions: some states use the 15 percent policy to exempt ABAWDs in certain areas
where FNS waiver requests were denied, other states exempt ABAWDs based on age
or other demographic criteria, and some allocate 15 percent exemptions to individual
12Appendix C.3 provides details on the definition of an ABAWD as well as waiver and exemption
details.
1314 states make this pledge at some point between 2005-2010.
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counties to use them as they see fit.
This study therefore collected data on FNS approved waivers as well as state and
local policies that would impact how binding the work restrictions are for ABAWDs.
Information on ABAWD policies between 2005 and 2009 come from a number of different
sources, summarized in Appendix C.4. The FNS provided documentation of the full
history of waiver requests and outcomes (approval/denial) for each year between 2005
and 2009. However, this information does not cover exemptions that states awarded
by using their 15 percent allocation. To obtain information on state 15 percent usage
and other local policies, we first surveyed state SNAP programs. This survey yielded
at least partial data on how the state combines federal waivers with local options for
enforcing the work restriction for 18 states. For states from which we did not receive
sufficient information, we searched for further information on the state’s SNAP policy
and legislative websites. We were able to add at least partial 15 percent exemption
information for 13 states.
As noted, some states deliberately used their 15 percent exemptions to cover areas
that were marginally ineligible for federal waivers, or certain populations in such areas.
Where this was the case, the exempt areas or populations were coded directly into our
exemptions data. For 24 states we were unable to determine 15 percent exemption usage.
This is either because we do not have the policy information available (if our data source
is only the FNS), or because the state does not use geographic or demographic criteria
for allocating exemptions. We therefore supplement our policy data with state-month
level 15 percent exemption usage, obtained from the FNS.
Between 2009 and 2010, most areas are waived due to the ARRA, although some areas
refused to implement FNS waivers. Since many of these decisions were implemented at
the state/county/city level with little input from FNS, this post-ARRA waiver history was
obtained through an internet search of the relevant states’ SNAP policy and legislative
websites. Combined with the previous sources, we have waiver and (to some extent)
exemption status for all months 2005-2010.
In addition to waivers and exemptions, the SNAP work requirement might be less
binding for those states which have pledged to provide a SNAP E&T spot for all
ABAWDs, or which provide greater numbers of E&T spots without a pledge. We
therefore obtained from FNS the list of pledge states, federal pledge allocations, and
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state E&T participation numbers for the fiscal years which overlap our years of interest
4.3.3 Other data
We supplement our detailed SNAP ABAWD policy data with state minimum wage
information (Urban Institute and Brookings Institution, Tax Policy Center, http:
//www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/state-minimum-wage-rates-1983-2014).
In addition, we obtain monthly unemployment rates for the geographic areas we are able
to identify in the CPS from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment
Statistics. Finally, we include state-month SNAP policy data from the SNAP policy
database (United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, http
s://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/snap-policy-database), which is available
through December 2011.
4.4 Estimation and identification strategy
4.4.1 Benchmark model
Our benchmark model estimates each of the five outcomes as a function of the waiver
status of the area in which the individual lives Wat,
14 year fixed effects τt, individual
fixed effects ηi, time-varying individual Xit, area Xat, and state characteristics Xst:
Yit = αWat + β1Xit + β2Xat + β3Xst + ηi + τt + εit, (4.1)
In this framework, α is an unbiased estimator if the area’s waiver status Wat is uncorre-
lated with time-varying unobserved drivers of labor market outcomes εit, conditional on
the other covariates.
One threat to this assumption comes from the possibility of unobserved time-varying
factors influencing both the timming of waivers and individual outcomes. We are worried
primarily about three sources of these factors. First, local labor market conditions
14Wat is defined as a binary variable for whether over 50 percent of the area’s 2010 Census population is
covered by a waiver in that month. We use a binary variable instead of the the percent of the population
covered by a waiver because most of the area-months have percents of either 0 or 100: 83 percent of
area-months in our sample have fully homogenous waiver status, and 94 percent of area-months have
homogenous waiver status for over 80 percent of the area’s population. The binary waiver definition
simplifies coefficient interpretation while losing very little policy information.
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are a basis for an area’s waiver status, and worsening labor markets mean ABAWDs
would be less likely to work. To account for this, we control for area contemporaneous
unemployment rate.15 The second source of unoberved heterogeneity stems from the
fact that a state’s waiver and exemption strategy fits in with the state’s broader SNAP
strategy, which could influence ABAWD labor supply outside of waiver status. We
therefore also control for characteristics of the state SNAP program16 and whether the
state is a pledge state. Finally, the ARRA increased SNAP benefits in addition to
waiving the work requirement, and was implemented in 2009 as a result of the recession
when many other factors might have been changing for ABAWDs. We therefore estimate
additional models restricted to pre-ARRA years.
One final concern is that waiver status in our data may be measured with systematic
error. This could be the case for two reasons. First, our waiver status measure captures
15 percent exemptions for only some states. If conditions in these states are changing in
different ways from states for which we have imperfect exemption information, our results
might be biased. Second, our waiver status measure is a binary measure for whether
most of the population in that area was covered by a waiver. Economic conditions in
areas for which we have full confidence that an individual is waived might change in
different ways from areas that we know only an individual’s waiver status with a certain
probability. We explore these concerns more fully in Appendix C.5, and find that our
results are larger in absolute value for individuals in areas for which we have full 15
percent exemption information but that the results are not different for individuals in
areas with a non-homogenous waiver status.
While we restrict our analysis to ABAWDs under 150 percent of poverty, further
subpopulations of ABAWDs might be more impacted by SNAP policy. We therefore
estimate separate models for minority (non-white) ABAWDs under 150 percent of poverty
and ABAWDs under 150 percent of poverty with less than a high school education
15To further account for local economic conditions, in analyses not shown here we included the state’s
housing price index, obtained from Zillow. Our results are robust to the inclusion of the housing price
index. We do not include this index in our final analysis because it is missing for a number of states.
16SNAP program characteristics that we include are: whether the state uses broad-based categorical
eligibility, whether the state uses a SNAP application combined with the Supplementary Security
Income application, whether SNAP participants are disqualified for not meeting other non-SNAP welfare
requirements, whether a telephone interview is sufficient, whether the state allows an online application,
the total amount of outreach expenditures, and whether the state uses simplified reporting. Note that a
state’s SNAP characteristics can and do change over time.
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(“low-educated ABAWDs”).
4.4.2 Testing impact heterogeneity
Characteristics of the state policy environment are likely to impact how binding the
SNAP work requirement is for ABAWDs. Since pledge states choose to provide all
ABAWDs with qualifying work opportunites, we would expect that changes in an area’s
waiver status would have less of an impact on ABAWD employment than in non-pledge
states. We therefore test whether the impact is different for pledge state-months17 by
interacting the waiver status with an indicator variable for whether the individual lives
in a pledge state-month (Pst):
18
Yit = α1Wat + α2Wat × Pst + β1Xit + β2Uat + β3Xst + ηi + τt + εit, (4.2)
State SNAP E&T programs vary widely even among non-pledge states. Some E&T
components satisfy the work requirement, so ABAWDs in states with more widely-
available or comprehensive E&T programs could plausibly have an easier time fulfilling
the requirement without formal employment. Thus waiving the work requirement would
have a smaller impact, since fewer ABAWDs were being required to work when the
requirement was binding. To test this, we interact the waiver impact with the state-month
SNAP E&T slots filled, following the form of Equation 4.2.
In addition to state SNAP policy, minimum wages differ by state and over time. Since
ABAWDs are characterized by low skill and low education, the minimum wage provides
a plausible opportunity cost of unemployment. A higher minimum wage would increase
the cost of unemployment, so we would expect that waiving the work requirement in
states-months with higher minimum wages would decrease the potential negative impact
on employment. In a third specification, we therefore interact the waiver impact with
whether the state-month has a minimum wage between 101 percent and 140 percent
of the prevailing federal minimum wage (“medium minimum wage”) and whether the
state-month minimum wage is over 140 percent of the federal minimum wage (“high
17States choose to pledge each fiscal year. A few states decided to pledge all years; more states pledged
in only a few of the years in our sample.
18We include the level of the test variable Pst in the vector of state-month controls Xst.
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minimum wage”).19 We estimate separate models testing impact heterogeneity for all
years and for just pre-ARRA years.
4.4.3 Event study model
We also allow the waiver impact to vary over time in an event study framework by
adding a series of variables for lagged waiver status and future waiver status. Controlling
for current waiver status, if waivers have an increasing impact over time we would
expect lagged waiver status to be negatively associated with current outcomes. On the
other hand, if there are no unobservables determining both waiver status in a particular
month and an individual’s outcome, future waiver status should be uncorrelated with
the contemporaneous outcome.
To implement the event study framework, we first group months into quarters and
define quarters relative to the current month (“Quarter 0”). Quarter -1 includes months
-1 to -3. Quarter -2 includes months -4 to -6, quarter -3 includes months -7 to -9, quarter
-4 includes months -10 to -12, and quarter -5 includes months -13 through -15. The lead
quarters are defined similarly, where for example quarter 1 includes months 1 through





αjWi,t+j + β1Xit + β2Uat + β3Xst + ηi + τt + εit, (4.3)
where Wi,t+j is the waiver status of the lagged-j quarter, and the coefficients of interest
are the αj . We restrict the sample to low-income ABAWDs with less than high school
education in pre-ARRA years who live in areas that only gained a waiver once in
pre-ARRA years, and we exclude pledge states.21
19Over 140% identifies the top 75th percentile of the minimum wage distribution. The interactions are
relative to the waiver impact in low minimum wage states, or those with a minimum wage equal to the
prevailing federal minimum wage. We also include the levels of whether the individual lives in a medium
or high minimum wage state.
20Results are robust to whether the current month is included as a separate pseudo-quarter 0, in
quarter -1, or in quarter 1.
21Due to the small sample size, the vocational training event study regression uses the full sample of
low-income ABAWDs over all years.
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4.4.4 Placebo models
The event study specification provides an initial placebo test by testing whether future
waiver status predicts current outcomes. We provide further placebo tests by restricting
the sample to subsamples who are less likely to have been subject to the SNAP work
requirement: ABAWDs over 250 percent of poverty, ABAWDs with at least some college
education, and individuals who live in households with children under 18. High-income
and highly-educated ABAWDs are less likely to be eligible for SNAP and therefore have
work decisions constrained by the work requirement, and individuals in households with
children are by definition not ABAWDs and are not subject to the work requirement.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Descriptive
Table 4.1 shows the means of the control variables for non-ABAWD adults, all ABAWDs,
and ABAWDs under 150 percent of poverty. ABAWDs in general are wealthier, younger,
better-educated, and are more likely to be white and less likely to be Hispanic than
non-ABAWDs. However, ABAWDs under 150 percent of poverty are more likely to
be non-white and have less education than the non-ABAWD population. Almost 60
percent of ABAWDs under 150 percent of poverty have a high school education or less,
compared with just over 30 percent for ABAWDs in general and just under 50 percent
for non-ABAWDs.
In Table 4.2, we show the means of the outcome variables for ABAWD-months in
waived and unwaived areas, restricting the sample to low-income ABAWDs with waiver
variation over time. Waived ABAWD-months exhibit lower employment and fewer hours
of work than unwaived ABAWD-months. This is consistent with waivers being used
in areas and at times of higher unemployment. There is no difference in part-time




Table 4.3 shows the results for the benchmark model for all ABAWDs under 150 percent
of poverty, ABAWDs under 150 percent of poverty with less than a high school education,
and minority ABAWDs under 150 percent of poverty. Models 4-6 restrict the sample
further to only pre-ARRA years. Each cell reports the coefficient α on the variable
indicating whether the individual was covered by a waiver in that month.
Panel A shows consistent evidence that a waiver decreases the probability that a low-
income ABAWD is employed. Overall, waivers decrease the probability of employment for
low-income ABAWDs by 3 to 5 percent. Low-educated and minority ABAWDs respond
more strongly to waiving the SNAP work requirement than low-income ABAWDs in
general. This likely reflects the fact that low-educated and minority ABAWDs are more
likely to participate in SNAP and therefore be effected by a change in SNAP policy.
Waivers in pre-ARRA years have a larger effect than in all years, and cause a decrease
in the probability of employment by up to 10 percent in populations most likely to
participate in SNAP.
The impact of waivers on weekly hours worked, displayed in Panel B, tells a similar
story. Waivers decrease hours worked in the overall low-income ABAWD population
between 0.5 and 1.5 hours, though these impacts are not statistically significant. Hours
worked decreases primarily in minority and low-educated low-income ABAWD popu-
lations, which are most likely to participate in SNAP, with larger effects before the
ARRA. Waivers decrease weekly hours worked by approximately 2-5 hours in minority
and low-educated ABAWDs. Panel C shows the impact of waivers on the indicator for
whether the ABAWD worked over 20 hours, conditional on working less than full-time.
Waiver implementation leads to a reduction of up to 12 percent in the probability that
an ABAWD works over 20 hours per week, with larger impact prior to the ARRA and
in minority and low-educated populations.
Panels D and E show the impact of waivers on whether the ABAWD is enrolled
part-time in school or a vocational training program. Waivers have no impact on
whether an individual enrolls part-time in school - the estimated coefficient is both
very small and statistically insignificant. While statistically insignificant - possibly due
to the very small sample size of ABAWDs that we observe from October to October
with variation in waiver status and vocational training - waivers have a heterogeneous
99
impact on vocational training. Waivers decrease the probability of vocational training in
the overall low-income ABAWD population, but low-educated poor ABAWDs increase
participation in vocational training due to waivers. Prior to the ARRA, waivers increased
the probability of vocational training participation among low-educated ABAWDs by
almost 50 percent, though we hesitate to emphasize this given the substantial uncertainty
surrounding the estimate.
4.5.3 Impact heterogeneity
We investigate heterogeneity in our results in Table 4.4, which displays the coefficients
on the waiver status and the interaction between waiver and relevant test variable as
defined in Section 4.4.2. Since the results discussed in the previous section indicated
that the waiver impacts were concentrated in populations most likely to participate in
SNAP, we restrict the sample for this analysis to minority ABAWDs under 150 percent
of poverty.
Looking across Panels A-E in Table 4.4, we see first that being in a pledge state
does not appreciably change the waiver impact. The number of state SNAP E&T slots
has a similarly small and statistically insignificant impact on how the waiver influences
ABAWD outcomes.22 When considering how the minimum wage interacts with waiver
status, however, a robust story emerges: A higher minimum wage can completely swamp
any negative impacts of waivers on labor market outcomes. In areas with a low minimum
wage, waivers decrease the probability of employment by up to 14 percent, the number of
hours worked by 3, and the probability of working over 20 hours by 17 percent. A high
minimum wage, in contrast, eliminates the negative impact of a waiver on employment
and work intensity: The cumulative waiver impact on the probability of employment
in areas with a high minimum wage is −0.01 for all months and 0.024 in pre-ARRA
months, and is statistically insignificant.23 Though not statistically significant, a similar
story is evident for hours worked24 and whether the ABAWD worked over 20 hours per
22The mean level of total E&T participants divided by 100,000 is 0.18. Thus for example the waiver
impact over all months at the mean SNAP E&T levels on the probability of employment is −0.07, on
the number of weekly hours worked is −0.98, and on the probability of working over 20 hours is −0.01.
23The standard error on the cumulative waiver impact in high minimum wage areas for all months is
0.04 and has a p-value of 0.785 on the two-tailed test of the null that the cumulative impact equals zero.
Similar results hold for the pre-ARRA cumulative impact.




Figure 4.2 displays the event study coefficients αj from Equation 4.3.
26 We observe
very small and statistically insignificant impacts of future waiver status on employment
and hours worked, which provides confidence in our identification strategy. While
multicollinearity between the lagged and future waiver status means that the coefficients
are often not statistically significantly different from zero, having a waiver in the current
month decreases the probability of being employment by almost 20 percent and decreases
hours worked by approximately 3. A current waiver slightly decreases the probability
of working over 20 hours, but we do not emphasize this result due to a potential
upward trend in the future waiver status. Part-time schooling and vocational training
display instability in future waiver status and little discernable effect around waiver
implementation. Interestingly, vocational training dips substantially two quarters prior
to waiver implementation. One potential explanation for this could be states ramping
down E&T programs, which can include vocational training components, in anticipation
of a waiver implementation. We note, however, that we did not find policy or anecdotale
documentation of such activity.
The waiver appears to mainly have a short-term impact: conditional on current
waiver status, having a waiver in the previous quarter actually increases the probability
of being employed in the current quarter. This lagged increase in probability swamps
much of the previous decrease in employment. A similar trend is evident for hours
worked and whether the individual worked over 20 hours per week.
4.5.5 Placebo samples
Table 4.5 shows the results of running the benchmark model on our placebos. Column 1
uses a sample of ABAWDs with incomes over 250% of poverty, column 2 uses a sample
statistically-insignificant −0.11 hours, with a standard error of 1.68.
25The waiver impact for all months in high minimum wage states on the probability of working over
20 hours per week is a statistically-insignificant 0.03, with a standard error of 0.04.
26We estimate Equation 4.3 using the minority ABAWD sample, which provides us qualitatively
similar results to the low-educated sample while increasing the sample size. A larger sample size helps in
teasing apart often very strongly-correlated relationships between lagged and future waiver status.
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of ABAWDs who have at least some college education, and column 3 uses a sample
of adults in households with children. The waiver has tiny and mostly statistically
insignificant impacts on populations most unlikely to participate in SNAP. While the
waiver coefficient is statistically significant in predicting part-time school enrollment
among ABAWDs with some college and adults with children, the effect sizes are miniscule.
These placebos indicate that the waiver did not have an impact on households who were
(mostly) ineligible to participate in SNAP and so should not have been directly impacted
by the waiver.
4.6 Conclusion
In this paper we test the extent to which ABAWDs respond to the SNAP work require-
ment, which has generated significant policy discussion. We find that waiving the work
requirement decreases ABAWD employment by up to 10 percent, reduces weekly hours
worked by up to 4 hours among individuals most likely to participate in SNAP, and
some evidence of a reduction in the probability of working over 20 hours per week. The
impact is short-term, however, and is substantially smaller in the first quarter after a
waiver is implemented. Higher minimum wages substantially decrease the impact of
waivers on employment and work intensity. We find no effect on part-time schooling and
vocational training.
Our results contribute to the discussion surrounding work disincentives of SNAP and
other social safety net policies, as well as the impact of work requirements designed to
mitigate any work disincentives. We note a few limitations of our approach. First, the
CPS only imperfectly allows for identification of ABAWDs. If our ABAWD definition
includes many non-ABAWDs who would not be subject to the work requirement, our
results may provide a lower bound for the impact on “true” ABAWDs. Second, ABAWDs
who are eligible to participate in SNAP may not be fully captured by surveys such as
the CPS. ABAWDs are often transient, creating difficulties for programs that seek to
remain in contact with them (Ohio Association of Foodbanks, 2014). ABAWDs may
therefore be less likely to participate in the CPS and may be more likely to move during
the CPS survey period, thus limiting our ability to observe ABAWDs in the CPS. Third,
the CPS only allows researchers to follow individuals for up to one year. We therefore
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do not observe a specific ABAWD for any more than a year after gaining a waiver,
which restricts our ability to infer long-term impacts.27 Finally, our waiver data include
imperfect information on 15 percent exemptions and related local policies. We find
evidence that our identification strategy is valid, but this lack of comprehensive local
information likely introduces error into our waiver status classification.
With these limitations in mind, we find that when ABAWDs are not required to
work in order to participate in SNAP, in some cases they choose not to. We do not
evaluate whether the drop in the probability of employment or the drop in weekly hours
worked is in any way “large” or “small”. However, the fact that ABAWDs respond
differently to waivers based on the prevailing minimum wage - and that higher minimum
wages imply smaller work disincentives - suggests that a work disincentive is not simply
the case of an individual choosing to be “lazy.” Instead, much of what we observe to
be work disincentives due to the social safety net may be a result of a lack of proper
incentives outside of the structure of the social safety net.
27The CPS does, however, provide a large sample of ABAWDs who are at varying lengths past waiver
implementation, which we exploit in our event study.
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4.7 Figures and Tables
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Figure 4.2: Estimated impact of current, future, and past waiver exposure
105
Table 4.1: Means and proportions describing the CPS sample
ABAWDs
Non-ABAWDs All < 150% poverty
Age 33.82 33.83 31.23
(9.24) (9.45) (9.94)
White 0.56 0.72 0.55
(0.50) (0.45) (0.50)
Black 0.13 0.13 0.26
(0.34) (0.34) (0.44)
Hispanic 0.22 0.09 0.13
(0.42) (0.29) (0.34)
Income: under $20,000 0.10 0.07 0.85
(0.30) (0.26) (0.36)
Income: $20,000-29,999 0.13 0.11 0.15
(0.33) (0.31) (0.36)
Income: $30,000-49,999 0.17 0.18 0.00
(0.37) (0.39) (0.06)
Income: $50,000-74,999 0.17 0.18 0.00
(0.37) (0.39) (0.00)
Income: $75,000 or more 0.44 0.45 0.00
(0.50) (0.50) (0.00)
Education: Less than high school 0.16 0.06 0.20
(0.37) (0.25) (0.40)
Education: High school 0.29 0.29 0.39
(0.45) (0.46) (0.49)
Education: Some college 0.30 0.30 0.27
(0.46) (0.46) (0.44)
Education: College or higher 0.25 0.34 0.14
(0.43) (0.48) (0.35)
Household size 4.01 2.14 2.01
(1.47) (0.97) (1.04)
Observations 2169487 1073641 72876
Notes: This table compares means of the control variables in non-waived vs waived months for adult
non-ABAWDs between 18 and 49 years old, all ABAWDs, and ABAWDs under 150% of poverty.
Means are weighted by the CPS sampling weight; differences in the number of observations are due
to sampling weights and missing values. Standard deviations are displayed in parentheses under the
mean.
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Table 4.2: ABAWD outcome means, by waiver status
Not waived Waived
A. Whether employed 0.66 0.61
(0.47) (0.49)
Number of ABAWD-months 2335 2310
Number of unique ABAWDs 939
B. Weekly hours worked 20.47 18.90
(19.15) (19.79)
Number of ABAWD-months 2138 2120
Number of unique ABAWDs 854
C. Whether worked 20+ hours 0.52 0.48
(0.50) (0.50)
Number of ABAWD-months 2335 2310
Number of unique ABAWDs 939
D. Whether enrolled in part-time school 0.01 0.01
(0.10) (0.08)
Number of ABAWD-months 2335 2310
Number of unique ABAWDs 939
E. Whether enrolled in vocational training 0.03 0.03
(0.17) (0.18)
Number of ABAWD-months 153 134
Number of unique ABAWDs 170
Notes: This table compares mean outcomes in non-waived vs waived
months for ABAWDs under 150% of poverty with variation in work
requirement waiver status over time. Means are weighted by the
CPS sampling weight; differences in the number of observations are
due to sampling weights and missing values. Standard deviations
are displayed in parentheses under the mean. Also displayed are
the number of individual ABAWDs that have variation in waiver
status and no missing values for that variable.
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Table 4.3: Impact of waivers: benchmark model
All months Pre-ARRA
All ABAWDs Low-educated Minority All ABAWDs Low-educated Minority
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Whether employed
Waiver -0.025 -0.092** -0.069** -0.048* -0.10 -0.096*
(0.018) (0.044) (0.032) (0.027) (0.065) (0.050)
N 52,751 9,204 19,395 38,091 6,748 13,772
B. Weekly hours worked
Waiver -0.55 -3.65** -1.29 -1.47 -5.73** -2.03
(0.73) (1.56) (1.26) (1.01) (2.36) (1.87)
N 51,535 9,014 18,898 37,162 6,587 13,389
C. Whether worked 20+ hours
Waiver -0.013 -0.073* -0.019 -0.048* -0.12* -0.047
(0.019) (0.041) (0.029) (0.026) (0.061) (0.041)
N 52,751 9,204 19,395 38,091 6,748 13,772
D. Whether enrolled in part-time school
Waiver -0.0019 -0.000071 -0.0023 -0.0058 -0.0028 -0.0085
(0.0036) (0.0031) (0.0049) (0.0055) (0.0044) (0.0078)
N 52,751 9,204 19,395 38,091 6,748 13,772
E. Whether enrolled in vocational training
Waiver -0.028 0.040 0.044 -0.036 0.47 -0.0098
(0.042) (0.045) (0.035) (0.071) (0.32) (0.055)
N 4,257 711 1,536 3,138 531 1,094
Notes: Each parameter is from a separate OLS regression of the outcome on whether the
individual lived in an waived area in a particular month, using as samples all ABAWDs
under 150% of poverty, ABAWDs under 150% of poverty with less than a high school
education, and non-white ABAWDs under 150% of poverty. Models 4-6 are restricted to pre-
ARRA years 2005-2008. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at individual level and
observations are weighted using average CPS survey weights. ∗∗∗p < 0.01∗∗p < 0.05∗p < 0.1
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Table 4.4: Impact heterogeneity
All months Pre-ARRA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Whether employed
Waiver -0.069** -0.060 -0.12** -0.096* -0.098 -0.14**
(0.032) (0.043) (0.060) (0.049) (0.069) (0.067)
Waiver × pledge state 0.014 -0.019
(0.083) (0.11)
Waiver × state E&T slots -0.030 0.0057
(0.089) (0.15)
Waiver × high minimum wage 0.11* 0.17**
(0.063) (0.085)
Waiver × medium minimum wage 0.050 0.030
(0.052) (0.053)
N 19,395 19,395 19,395 13,772 13,772 13,772
B. Weekly hours worked
Waiver -1.28 -0.41 -2.58 -2.04 -0.97 -3.28
(1.26) (1.75) (2.28) (1.87) (2.72) (2.59)
Waiver × pledge state -0.72 0.17
(2.46) (3.24)
Waiver × state E&T slots -3.12 -3.76
(3.89) (5.72)
Waiver × high minimum wage 2.48 4.52
(2.45) (3.16)
Waiver × medium minimum wage 1.17 0.54
(2.00) (2.04)
N 18,898 18,898 18,898 13,389 13,389 13,389
C. Whether worked more than 20 hours
Waiver -0.018 0.00070 -0.069 -0.047 -0.016 -0.091
(0.029) (0.040) (0.055) (0.041) (0.060) (0.060)
Waiver × pledge state -0.021 0.015
(0.076) (0.099)
Waiver × state E&T slots -0.068 -0.11
(0.096) (0.14)
Continued on next page
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Table 4.4 – continued from previous page
All months Pre-ARRA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Waiver × high minimum wage 0.099 0.14
(0.063) (0.083)
Waiver × medium minimum wage 0.046 0.031
(0.053) (0.055)
N 19,395 19,395 19,395 13,772 13,772 13,772
D. Whether enrolled in part-time school
Waiver -0.0024 -0.0032 -0.014 -0.0088 -0.012 -0.018
(0.0049) (0.0087) (0.013) (0.0078) (0.016) (0.014)
Waiver × pledge state -0.00088 0.0078
(0.0092) (0.012)
Waiver × state E&T slots 0.0031 0.014
(0.022) (0.032)
Waiver × high minimum wage 0.025 0.028
(0.018) (0.018)
Waiver × medium minimum wage 0.010 0.0081
(0.012) (0.011)
N 19,395 19,395 19,395 13,772 13,772 13,772
E. Whether enrolled in vocational training
Waiver 0.050 0.073 0.044 -0.025 0.034 0.0060
(0.038) (0.050) (0.040) (0.051) (0.055) (0.052)
Waiver × pledge state -0.26 -0.32
(0.16) (0.22)
Waiver × state E&T slots -0.16 -0.20
(0.16) (0.20)
Waiver × high minimum wage -0.035 -0.046
(0.055) (0.067)
Waiver × medium minimum wage 0.016 0.0087
(0.027) (0.023)
N 1,536 1,536 1,536 1,094 1,094 1,094
Continued on next page
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Table 4.4 – continued from previous page
All months Pre-ARRA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Notes: Each parameter is from a separate OLS regression of the outcome on whether the
individual lived in an waived area in a particular month and an interaction between waiver
status and the relevant variable, using the sample of non-white ABAWDs under 150% of
poverty. Relevant variables are: whether the individual lives in a high-minimum wage state
(>140% of the federal minimum wage), whether the individual lives in a mid-minimum wage
state (between 100 and 140% of the federal minimum wage, exclusive), and the number
of SNAP E&T participants in that state-month divided by 100,000. The minimum wage
indicators are all relative to states with the minimum wage equal to the federal minimum
wage. Models 4-6 are restricted to pre-ARRA years 2005-2008. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at individual level and observations are weighted using average CPS survey
weights. ∗∗∗p < 0.01∗∗p < 0.05∗p < 0.1
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Table 4.5: Impact of waivers: placebos
High income High education With children
(1) (2) (3)
A. Whether employed
Waiver -0.0024 -0.0033 0.00082
(0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0017)
N 721,028 548,729 2,275,392
B. Weekly hours worked
Waiver -0.030 -0.11 0.059
(0.14) (0.16) (0.068)
N 705,462 538,277 2,239,844
C. Whether worked 20+ hours
Waiver 0.00044 0.00090 0.00093
(0.0031) (0.0036) (0.0017)
N 721,028 548,729 2,275,392
D. Whether enrolled in part-time school
Waiver -0.00072 -0.0018* -0.00072*
(0.00082) (0.0011) (0.00043)
N 721,028 548,729 2,275,392
E. Whether enrolled in vocational training
Waiver -0.0057 -0.0046 0.0015
(0.0053) (0.0069) (0.0027)
N 57,589 44,218 179,441
Notes: Each parameter is from a separate OLS regression of the outcome on whether
the individual lived in an waived area in a particular month. The high income sample
includes ABAWDs with incomes over 250% of poverty, the high education sample
includes individuals with at least some college education, and the sample with children
includes all adults in households with at least one child under 18. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at individual level and observations are weighted using average




This dissertation investigates how households respond to policies designed to improve
access to food for low-income households.
In my first chapter, I ask whether a supply- or demand-focused policy is more effective
at encouraging households to shop for food more at grocery stores vs convenience stores.
I find that a demand-focused policy unambiguously increases shopping at grocery stores
relative to convenience stores, but that neither policy reduces absolute shopping at
convenience stores. My estimates allow me to quantify the tradeoff between the two
policy levers. The results from this chapter highlight the role of small ethnic stores in
the food environment for low-income urban SNAP participants. I also find substantially
heterogenous impacts by car ownership. These results point to future research directions
into how urban residents use small ethnic stores, and how car ownership and access
influence a household’s store choice decision.
My second chapter tests whether transaction costs contribute to the rate at which
SNAP participants spend their benefits. I find that proximity to grocery stores can
matter, but that the impact is likely nonlinear over distance. I also find that car
ownership matters, but in somewhat unexpected ways.
Finally, my third chapter measures SNAP participant labor market responses to
the SNAP work requirement. I find that waiving the work requirement has the largest
impact on low-educated participants, but that the impact is short-lived. Importantly,
I also find that a high minimum wage decreases the waiver impact substantially. This
suggests that the work requirement may not be an important driver of employment if
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low-income workers are already paid enough. It also highlights the role of the broader
labor market in determining work outcomes for SNAP participants.
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Appendix A
Consumer Choice of Store
Format: Response to Policy
Incentives
A.1 Theoretical framework: Details
In the second stage, the household maximizes utility1 subject to the store-specific budget
constraint:
In the convenience store, the household solves
maximize
h
U(b, tl) subject to pcbh ≤ Y
which yields Marshallian demand for candy bars Bc(pcb, Y ).
2
In the grocery store, the household solves
maximize
h,k
U(b, k, tl) subject to pgbh+ pgkk ≤ Y
yielding Marshallian demands Bg(pgb, pgk, Y ) and Kg(pgb, pgk, Y ).
1For notational convenience, in the lower stage we suppress the additive stochastic term.
2Since there is only one good, Bc(pcb, Y ) =
Y
pcb
. Since we do not assume any functional form,
specifying this does not add anything to the model. We thus continue to use Bc(pcb, Y ) instead.
127
Thus a trip to the convenience store provides the household with indirect utility
V c = V (Bc(pcb, Y ), T − tc) + εc,
and a trip to the grocery store provides the household indirect utility
V g = V (Bg(pgb, pgk, Y ),Kg(pgb, pgk, Y ), T − tg) + εg
In the first stage, the household compares indirect utilities, and will choose to visit the
grocery store if V g > V c.
A.1.1 Comparative statics
Setup
Let the probability that a household chooses the grocery store over the convenience store
to be Prg. Following the standard discrete choice model setup, this probability is the
cumulative distribution function F of εc − εg:
Prg =Pr(V (Bg(pgb, pgk, Y ),Kg(pgb, pgk, Y ), T − tg) + εg − V (Bc(pcb, Y ), T − tc) − εc > 0)
=Pr(V (Bg(pgb, pgk, Y ),Kg(pgb, pgk, Y ), T − tg) − V (Bc(pcb, Y ), T − tc) > εc − εg)
=F(εc−εg)(V (Bg(pgb, pgk, Y ),Kg(pgb, pgk, Y ), T − tg) − V (Bc(pcb, Y ), T − tc))
(A.1)
Letting Dg ≡ V (Bg(pgb, pgk, Y ),Kg(pgb, pgk, Y ), T − tg) − V (Bc(pcb, Y ), T − tc) and
ε = εc − εg, we summarize (A.1) as
Prg = Fε(Dg). (A.2)
We now look at the effect of opening a grocery store - which would decrease the time
necessary to get to the grocery store tg - and increasing household resources - which
would increase the food budget Y - on the probability of visiting a grocery store given
in Equation A.2.
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Impact of changing access
A grocery store opening close to the household decreases the time that it takes to get
to a grocery store.3 As long as the household continues to derive utility from having
extra leisure time, it is more likely to visit the grocery store than before. Formally, let
t̃g = −tg denote the decreasing distance to the grocery store. The probability of visiting












where V gtl is the marginal utility of leisure time, conditional on going to the grocery store.
Note that cumulative distribution functions are non-decreasing and thus ∂Fε∂Dg ≥ 0. The
effect of a grocery store opening closer to a household therefore crucially depends on V gtl .
As long as the marginal utility of leisure time is positive, both terms on the right hand
side are non-negative and
∂Prg
∂t̃g
≥ 0. Thus the probability of going to the grocery store
weakly increases when a closer grocery store opens.
While tg changes when stores open and close, we would also expect tg also to be
smaller for households with a car. In the empirical work, we therefore estimate the
relationship between Prg and distance to the grocery store separately for households
with and without cars.
Impact of increasing resources
Next, consider a policy of increasing the household’s food budget Y through, for example,
raising SNAP benefit levels. While the ultimate decision of whether to visit the grocery
store or the convenience store will still depend on the indirect utilities that include
leisure time as well as purchases, the impact of giving a household extra money depends
on what it does with that extra money. Thus the household compares the utility from
the kale and candy bars that the extra money enables it to purchase at the grocery store
3We assume here that all grocery stores offer the same products for the same prices, so the household
will only consider the closest grocery store. Relaxing this assumption creates a multinomial choice model
between three stores which complicates the comparison but does not provide further intuition into the
expected policy effects.
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with the utility from the candy bars that can be purchased from the convenience store
with that extra money.
Formally, we can investigate the impact of increasing the food budget on the pro-























where V gb and V
g
k are the marginal utilities of candy bars and kale, respectively, conditional
on going to the grocery store, V cb is the marginal utility of candy bars conditional on going
to the convenience store, and we suppress the arguments of the Marshallian demands
Bg, Kg, and Bc. Since
∂Fε
∂Dg
≥ 0, the impact of increasing the food budget depends on
how the extra resources influence the difference between the (indirect) utilities derived
from a grocery store visit and a convenience store visit
∂Dg
∂Y , which in turn depends on
the marginal propensity to consume candy bars at the convenience store, candy bars at
the grocery store, and kale at the grocery store, as well as the relative impact that more
candy bars and kale have on utility. There is no guarantee that
∂Dg
∂Y ≥ 0, so the impact
of increasing the food budget on grocery store shopping is ambiguous. To illustrate the
choice that the household faces, assume that the utility from candy bars and kale does
not depend on the choice of store type,4 i.e. V gb = V
c
b = Vb and V
g
k = Vk. We can then















Note that the opportunity cost of going to the grocery store after the increase in Y is
the utility from the additional candy bars that the household would have bought at the
convenience store relative to the grocery store, and the opportunity cost of going to the
convenience store is the utility from the additional kale that would have been bought
at the grocery store. Thus this condition states that the probability of going to the
4Thus there are no utility complementarities between kale, candy bars, and leisure time - more of one
does not change the marginal utility of another.
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grocery store after receiving extra resources is increasing if the opportunity cost of going
to the grocery store is less than the opportunity cost of going to the convenience store.
If ∂Bc∂Y −
∂Bg
∂Y < 0, that is, the household would choose to buy more candy bars at the
grocery store than the convenience store with the extra money, then as long as kale is a
normal good (
∂Kg
∂Y > 0) Equation A.4 will always be true, and an increase in the food
budget will unambiguously increase the probability of going to the grocery store. This
could be the case, for example, if convenience store food is significantly more expensive
than the equivalent grocery store food.
A.2 Data undergirding store access definitions
We use two sources of data to characterize a household’s food store access. Our primary
source is the transaction data, from which we create a dataset of all the stores visited by
SNAP households each month.5 There are two reasons a store might be observed in one
month but not the next in our transaction data: either the store does not exist, or no
household visited that store in that month. Stores with a large number of transactions
can be identified with confidence as existing in any particular month. There is more
uncertainty for stores that are visited by a handful of people. If the few people who
visited the store in the previous month do not to visit the store in the next month, for
example, we do not observe the store, although it is still open. To avoid misclassifying
these stores as not existing for those months, we supplement our store dataset with a
list of stores and authorization dates for all stores in our city that were authorized to
accept SNAP benefits. We use the transaction data to assign store-month availability
for all stores with over 50 average monthly transactions, as whether we observe these
stores is less likely to be impacted by the actions of just a few households. We use the
comprehensive list of stores and authorization dates to assign monthly availability for all
stores with fewer than 50 average monthly transactions.6 In our data a few large stores
are authorized to accept SNAP before households start visiting or after households stop
visiting (in the case of a store closing). The transaction data are therefore our preferred
5We define a “store” as a store format-coordinate combination. This enables us to avoid mis-identifying
store name or ownership changes as store supply changes.
6This includes the four percent of stores in the comprehensive list that were open but never visited
by any household in our dataset.
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source for information for stores with enough transactions per month to provide a stable
time series of store availability.
A.3 Comparison of stores in transaction data to all food
retail stores
To compare the number of stores that appear in our data to the total possible food stores
available, we use establishment counts at the county level. We obtain total numbers
of establishments using County Business Patterns (CBP) for each county in our area
of interest. Table B1 displays the number of SNAP establishments in each county as
a percent of the number of CBP establishments in 2009 (results are the same using
other years). Results are shown for all establishments overall, and then for different
establishment categories. Retail food stores are defined here as all establishments that
are either grocery stores (NAICS 2007 code 4451), specialty (NAICS 4452), drug (NAICS
44611), gasoline stations with convenience stores (NAICS 44711), and warehouse clubs
and supercenters (NAICS 45291). While these are the categories of stores found in our
SNAP data, two categories may be less likely to accept SNAP benefits and also less
important to the shopping needs of low income households: Specialty stores include
meat, fish, and fruit and vegetable markets, and only make up a very small share of the
total SNAP expenditures, while many drug stores and pharmacies may not carry food.
Thus, we provide alternate percentages, where these categories are taken out of both the
CBP and SNAP store count data. Counties 5 and 7 are the most urban counties, and
have the highest percent of stores represented in the SNAP data. For these populous
counties, around 80%-100% of the possible stores are represented in our SNAP data.
This coverage decreases significantly for less-populous counties.
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Table C1: Number of SNAP transaction establishments as % of CBP establishment
numbers, 2009 by county
Overall Non-specialty Non-specialty, non-drug
County
1 58.9 58.5 69.7
2 51.9 44.9 61.1
3 20 14.3 17.6
4 57.7 54.3 65.9
5 66.8 66.5 78.4
6 50 40.9 50
7 80.7 82.2 102.7
8 50.7 55.7 67.3
9 36 35.7 44.1
10 57.8 54.3 68.5
11 38.1 37.3 41.4
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A.4 Comparison of concentration index definitions
Grocery Convenience Discount Ethnic Other
Car No car Car No car Car No car Car No car Car No car
A. Weight: Inverse of distance
1
2
Index 0.8** 1.5*** 0.3 -1.1*** -0.3 0.02 -0.5** -0.7*** -0.3* 0.03
(0.4) (0.5) (0.2) (0.4) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1)
B. Weight: Inverse of distance
1
3
Index 1.0** 1.6*** 0.4 -1.3*** -0.3 0.10 -0.7** -0.8** -0.4* 0.03
(0.5) (0.6) (0.3) (0.5) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.2) (0.1)
C. Weight: Inverse of distance
1
4
Index 1.2* 1.8** 0.5 -1.5*** -0.4 0.2 -0.8* -1.0** -0.5* 0.03
(0.6) (0.8) (0.3) (0.5) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.3) (0.2)
D. Weight: Gaussian kernel, bandwidth 1 mile
Index 3.3*** 3.1** 0.6 -2.3*** -1.4* -0.4 -1.8** -1.8** -0.8 0.2
(1.1) (1.3) (0.7) (0.9) (0.8) (0.8) (0.8) (0.8) (0.5) (0.4)
E. Weight: Gaussian kernel, bandwidth 3 miles
Index 0.8 0.6 0.6* -0.4 -0.2 0.08 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6* -0.1
(0.6) (0.7) (0.3) (0.4) (0.5) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.3) (0.2)
F. Weight: Gaussian kernel, bandwidth 10 miles
Index -0.2 1.4 2.2*** -0.6 -0.3 0.2 -0.8 -1.8 -1.1 -0.3
(1.6) (2.1) (0.8) (1.2) (1.2) (1.3) (0.9) (1.3) (0.8) (0.6)
Notes: Each column is a different household fixed effect regression of access and
controls on store format expenditure shares, using different methods of defining the
store concentration index. Panel A weights each store by the inverse of distance
1
2 ,
Panel B weights stores by the inverse of distance
1
3 , Panel C weights stores by the
inverse of distance
1
4 , Panel D uses a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth of 1 mile, Panel
E uses a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth 3 miles, and Panel F uses a Gaussian kernel
with bandwidth of 10 miles. Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
∗∗∗p < 0.01∗∗p < 0.05∗p < 0.1
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Appendix B
The Impact of Access to Food
Retail Stores on Food Assistance
Spending Over the Month
B.1 Definition of benefit months
In Minnesota, regular benefit distribution is staggered over the 4th-13th of every calendar
month.1 The exact day that a household receives benefits is determined by the last digit
of the household’s administrative case number. We define the household’s benefit month
to be the time in between the first benefit issuance in a particular calendar month and
the first benefit issuance in the next calendar month. For a household that regularly
receives benefits on the 4th of the month, therefore, the household’s May benefit month
(for example) will consist of the days between the 4th of May and the 4th of June.2
Using the date of benefit disbursement, we calculate the number of days between the
disbursement and each EBT transaction. We define the first 7 days of the benefit month
to be the first week of the month.
1Households that are newly approved to receive SNAP benefits, or whose benefits are reinstated,
receive benefits as soon as they are approved. Thus the initial benefit issuance will not necessarily be on
the regular schedule, but all subsequent disbursements will follow the regular staggered schedule.
2If income or household size changes are reported too late in the month to be reflected in a current
month’s regular benefit issuance, additional benefits may be authorized during that month. A household
can therefore receive benefits multiple times in the same benefit month. We restrict our analysis to
months in which households received benefits only once.
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B.2 Comparison of grocery store index definitions
In this section we compare the impact of grocery store proximity using different continuous
measures of access, first varying the weight θ and then using a Gaussian kernel with
different bandwidths. Panel A is the measure used in the paper. In general, indices that
are more sensitive to smaller distances show a larger impact for households without cars.
The index chosen for this paper is the most conservative of the indices.
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Table B1: Impact of the grocery store concentration index on whether the household
spends SNAP benefits in the last half of the month
Dependent variables
% in first week 100% in first week
Car No car Car No car
A. Weight: Inverse of distance
1
2
Index -0.4 0.7 -0.002 -0.001
(0.5) (0.4) (0.006) (0.006)
B. Weight: Inverse of distance
1
3
Index -0.5 0.9 -0.003 -0.002
(0.7) (0.6) (0.008) (0.007)
C. Weight: Inverse of distance
1
4
Index -0.6 1.2 -0.004 -0.002
(0.8) (0.8) (0.010) (0.009)
D. Weight: Gaussian kernel, bandwidth 1 mile
Index -2.2 1.3 -0.01 -0.003
(1.6) (1.4) (0.02) (0.02)
E. Weight: Gaussian kernel, bandwidth 3 miles
Index -0.4 1.2 -0.004 0.002
(0.9) (0.8) (0.01) (0.009)
F. Weight: Gaussian kernel, bandwidth 10 miles
Index 0.5 3.4 -0.009 0.003
(2.5) (2.9) (0.03) (0.03)
Notes: Each column is a different household fixed effect regression of access and controls
on the outcome, using different methods of defining the store concentration index. Panel A
weights each store by the inverse of distance
1
2 , Panel B weights stores by the inverse of
distance
1
3 , Panel C weights stores by the inverse of distance
1
4 , Panel D uses a Gaussian
kernel with bandwidth of 1 mile, Panel E uses a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth 3 miles,
and Panel F uses a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth of 10 miles. Standard errors are
clustered at the household level. ∗∗∗p < 0.01∗∗p < 0.05∗p < 0.1
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Appendix C
Labor Market Outcomes and
Food Assistance for Able-Bodied
Adults in the U.S.
C.1 ABAWD definitions
Kramer-LeBlanc et al. (1997) use the Continuing Survey of Food Intakes by Individuals
(CSFII) 1989-1991 to estimate the impact of losing Food Stamps on non-working ABA-
WDs. They define an ABAWD household as one with no children under 18, no pregnant
female, and no disabled household head, but including a household member between 18
and 50 years old who is not working or working under 20 hours per week.
Farrell et al. measure income and SNAP participation among demographic groups
using the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). For their study, an
ABAWD is an individual who is not disabled, has no children, and is between 18 and
50. Disability is determined as either having a physical or mental limitation that made
them unable to work, or receiving Supplemental Security Income or disability payments.
McKernan and Ratcliffe (2003) measure employment and SNAP participation also
using the SIPP. An ABAWD is an individual 18-50 in a household that does not contain
any children, elderly, or disabled members.
Ratcliffe et al. (2008) use the SIPP to estimate the impact of Food Stamp policies
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on participation in the program. They define an ABAWD as an individual between 18
and 50 with no physical or mental work limitation, who live in a household with no
children, no person over 60, and no disabled individuals.
Currie et al. (2001) estimate determinants of the (then-) declining Food Stamp
participation using the March supplements of the Current Population Survey. Instead of
directly defining ABAWDs, they recognize that most ABAWDs live alone and use their
results for adults living alone to infer the impact on ABAWDs.
C.2 Area definitions
To the extent possible, area definitions are the smallest level identifiable in the CPS
with a homogenous waiver status. Areas are defined to never cross state lines. The
CPS geography identifiers allow for eight possible levels of areas: state, county, MSA,1
MSA principal city, MSA balance, city,2 state balance,3 county-principal city,4 and
exceptions.5 When an area exhibited a mixture of waiver levels, we used the 2010 Census
populations of the constituent sub-areas to calculate the proportion of that area that is
waived. As is apparent from the area definitions, the sizes of these areas vary greatly.
C.3 ABAWD policy details
An Able-bodied adult without dependent (ABAWD) is defined to be an individual
between the ages of 18 and 49 who is not disabled and does not have any dependents. A
dependant can be a child under 18 in the household, or an older incapacitated household
member. An individual must receive medical certification that they are unable to work
1Properly, the part of the MSA in a specific state. This level is used when the entire MSA has
homogenous waiver status across time, or if the principal city/balance is not identified for that MSA.
2The CPS occasionally identifies specific principal cities in large MSAs
3The state balance definition is the residual area of a state, after taking out the CPS-identified areas.
This level is used (for the rare occasions) when the entire state is waived or unwaived across time, with
the exception of some CPS-identifiable areas
4The county-principal city level is used for one city where the principal cities are split between
counties, and have different waiver status.
5The exception level is used for parts of MSAs that, with the exception of another CPS-identified
area, has the same waiver status. For example, the Indiana part of the Chicago MSA balance minus
Lake county is never waived until the ARRA, whereas Lake County, Indiana is waived before the ARRA.
So this region is split into a county area (Lake County) and an exception area.
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due to a physical or mental condition to be exempt from the work requirement.
The FNS allows several definitions of an insufficient number of jobs that states can
use to make waiver requests. Each year, the Department of Labors Employment and
Training Administration (DOLETA) publishes a list of labor surplus areas, which can
include counties, cities, and other equivalent sub-state jurisdictions. A jurisdiction is
classified as a labor surplus area when its average unemployment rate is at least 20
percent above the average unemployment rate for the nation during the previous two
calendar years, with a ceiling of 10 percent and a floor of 6 percent for periods of very
high or low national unemployment. In addition, states may apply the same rule (20
percent over the national average over 24 months), but to loosely defined economic areas
(which could include counties, cities, or parts of counties, as well as multiple-county
economic regions). Waivers can also be requested for areas with unemployment of at
least 10 percent, on average, over the last 12 or 3 months, if an area had a historically
high seasonal unemployment, or had experienced rapid economic changes. Finally, if
a state is eligible for extended unemployment benefits at any point, it is eligible for a
statewide waiver for the ensuing fiscal year.
15 percent exemption allocations are calculated by the FNS based on the number of
ABAWDs who would be subject to the work requirement, taking into account any waivers
the state uses. Exemption allowances carry over from the previous year, allowing states
to accumulate exemptions or to overuse exemptions and “pay back” those exemptions
over time. Some states, such as New Jersey, exempt substate areas that were ineligible for
FNS-approved waivers. Other states use the exemptions to give all ABAWDs additional
months of benefits in the 36-month period. For example, Massachussetts in 2005 decided
to use the 15 percent allocation to give all ABAWDs an additional three months of
benefits. Exemptions can also be used for “older” ABAWDs, or ABAWDs who live
in rural areas and are far from potential jobs or far from SNAP E&T or workfare
placements. Pennsylvania, for example, allows caseworkers to exempt individuals who
are exempt from participating in the E&T program due to distance or other hardship, and
until 2004 exempted ABAWDs aged 47-49. Pledge states may strategically combine 15
percent exemptions and waivers to focus E&T effort on certain counties while exempting
ABAWDs in others. Texas, for instance, uses 15 percent exemptions and waivers together
to waive ABAWDs in “minimum service” counties where E&T services are limited. Some
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states decide not to make a decision - California allocates 15 percent allocations to
counties to use as they wish. Still other states decide not to use the 15 percent exemptions
at all.
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C.4 Sources for waiver and exemption policy information

































New Jersey x x
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C.5 Systematic measurement error of waiver status
To investigate whether imperfect policy information leads to systematic non-classical
measurement error in waiver status, we run regressions following Equation ??, using as
Pst (1) an indicator for whether the individual lives in an area-month for which we were
unable to incorporate full 15 percent exemption information, and (2) an indicator for
whether the individual lives in an area-month with has non-binary waiver status (i.e.
the percent of the population waived is not 0 and not 100). The results are shown in
Table E2. The negative impact of waivers on employment and work intensity are driven
by areas for which we have full 15 percent exemption information. The waiver impact is
not different in areas with binary vs no-binary waiver status. Thus we conclude that our
main results are not subject to bias due to error in the measurement of waiver status.
Table E2: Imperfect policy information
All months Pre-ARRA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Whether employed
Waiver 0.022 -0.067 0.044 -0.065
(0.068) (0.049) (0.10) (0.074)
Waiver × full 15% info -0.14* -0.18
(0.077) (0.12)
Waiver × non-binary -0.11 -0.14
(0.097) (0.12)
N 9,204 9,204 6,748 6,748
B. Weekly hours worked
Waiver 1.96 -3.44** 6.30 -4.50*
(3.78) (1.71) (6.21) (2.53)
Waiver × full 15% info -6.55 -14.4**
(4.12) (6.68)
Waiver × non-binary -2.70 -5.32
(4.12) (5.25)
N 9,014 9,014 6,587 6,587
C. Whether worked more than 20 hours
Continued on next page
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Table E2 – continued from previous page
All months Pre-ARRA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Waiver 0.042 -0.064 0.13 -0.078
(0.095) (0.045) (0.13) (0.069)
Waiver × full 15% info -0.14 -0.31**
(0.099) (0.14)
Waiver × non-binary -0.093 -0.16
(0.11) (0.13)
N 9,204 9,204 6,748 6,748
D. Whether enrolled in part-time school
Waiver -0.0052 -0.000060 -0.0091 -0.0057
(0.0056) (0.0043) (0.0080) (0.0065)
Waiver × full 15% info 0.0061 0.0079
(0.0066) (0.0079)
Waiver × non-binary 0.014 0.023
(0.022) (0.027)
N 9,204 9,204 6,748 6,748
E. Whether enrolled in vocational training
Waiver 0.019 0.034 0.47 0.47
(0.046) (0.053) (0.32) (0.31)
Waiver × full 15% info 0.023 0
(0.055) (.)
Waiver × non-binary 0.025 -0.019
(0.067) (0.081)
N 711 711 531 531
Notes: Each parameter is from a separate OLS regression of the outcome on
whether the individual lived in an waived area in a particular month and an
interaction between waiver status and the relevant variable, using the sample
of low-educated ABAWDs under 150% of poverty. Relevant variables are:
whether the individual lives in an area-month for which full 15% exemption
information is unavailable, and whether the percent of an area’s population
waived is not 0% or 100% (“non-binary”). Models 3-4 restrict the sample
to pre-ARRA years 2005-2008. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
at individual level and observations are weighted using average CPS survey
weights. ∗∗∗p < 0.01∗∗p < 0.05∗p < 0.1
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